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CONSTITUTIONAL ENFORCEMENT BY PROXY
John F. Preis∗

A

MERICANS love their Constitution. But love, as we all know,
is blind. This may explain why we often look to constitutional
law to vindicate our civil rights while ignoring the potential of subconstitutional law. Federal courts have not ignored this possibility,
however, and have increasingly forced civil rights plaintiffs to seek
relief using sub-constitutional law where it is available. A victim of
discrimination, for example, might be denied the chance to invoke
the Equal Protection Clause and told instead to rely on a federal
antidiscrimination statute. In this and other cases, courts seem to believe that constitutional rights can be enforced through the application of sub-constitutional law, a practice this Article refers to as
“constitutional enforcement by proxy.”
This Article is the first to analyze the emerging practice of proxy
enforcement. This issue is important because it lies at the confluence
of several important discourses in the federal courts field—such as
the judicial duty to issue a remedy for every constitutional wrong,
the role of non-Article III actors in setting constitutional norms, and
the degree to which sub-constitutional law can, like the Constitution
itself, be “constitutive” of the national order. This Article’s central
claim is that proxy enforcement, properly administered, is permissible and even advisable in a large number of cases. It is permissible
because federal courts’ duty to supervise the behavior of non-Article
III actors does not require courts to invoke the Constitution directly
(unless Congress has ordered otherwise). If courts can maintain
constitutional norms using sub-constitutional law, they are entirely
free to do so.
The practice is normatively attractive because it promises a partial
truce in the everlasting debate over interpretive supremacy. By rely-
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ing on sub-constitutional law to enforce the Constitution, federal
courts allow non-Article III actors a significant role in the articulation of constitutional norms, a role normally denied them when
courts enforce the Constitution directly. Thus, sub-constitutional adjudication of civil rights claims does not spurn our love of the Constitution; it preserves individual rights while honoring a principle
that lies at the Constitution’s very heart: popular sovereignty.
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INTRODUCTION
Americans love their Constitution. A typical visit to Washington, D.C., might involve a trip to the National Air and Space Museum, a tour of the monuments on an amphibious bus, and quite
strangely, veneration of a legal document. That’s right. Americans
will stand in a long, snaking line outside the National Archives just
to see, for a brief moment, written law. The Constitution is maintained at the Archives in a way that would make the Second Restatement of Agency positively jealous. Encased in a brass cabinet
with a glass top, the document sits upon an altar that is framed by
marble columns, high ceilings, and opulent draperies. The atmosphere is overtly religious, as though the Ark of the Covenant were
on display.1
Given this solemn reverence of the Constitution, it should not be
surprising that constitutional adjudication is also treasured.2 The
American civil rights action is widely regarded as the premier tool
of social justice. It is how starving prisoners obtain food, women
fight stereotypes, and black schoolchildren obtain a meaningful
education.3 Although these successes, like the opulent draperies,
inspire our admiration, they also obscure a fundamental truth: the
Constitution is, at its core, simply a set of laws. The laws tell government actors how they must behave and in this respect are no
different from a great many other laws. Landmark civil rights statutes, for example, prohibit intentional discrimination just as the
1
The Constitution has long been described in quasi-religious terms. See, e.g., Bailey
v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922) (referring to the Constitution as “the
ark of our covenant”). For other commentary on this conception of the Constitution,
see Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (1988); Edward S. Corwin, The Worship
of the Constitution, 4 Const. Rev. 3 (1920), reprinted in 1 Corwin on the Constitution
47–55 (Richard Loss ed., 1981); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37
Stan. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1984) (calling the Constitution “a sacred symbol, the most potent
emblem (along with the flag) of the nation itself”).
2
See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutionalism and the Domain of Normative Theory, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 523, 531 (2000) (“Constitutional adjudication is attached firmly in our minds to a conception of the constitution as grand law . . . .”).
3
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (holding prison’s failure to feed prisoners
adequately a violation of the Eighth Amendment); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515 (1996) (holding public university’s refusal to admit women a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding school
district’s use of separate schools for African-Americans a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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Equal Protection Clause does.4 Even the common law of battery—
law that has no prayer of ever appearing on an altar in the National
Archives—can often do the work of the Fourth Amendment in excessive-force cases.5 Thus, one aggrieved by government actions
need not always rely on the ultimate law of government.
But what if a plaintiff, fresh off a trip to the Archives, preferred
to invoke the Constitution rather than some sub-constitutional
law? With increasing regularity, plaintiffs have been denied this
opportunity. Take, for example, Correctional Services Corp. v.
Malesko.6 The plaintiff there suffered a heart attack while in prison
and brought a civil rights action against the prison, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The Court never reached the
merits of the plaintiff’s claim because he “enjoy[ed] a parallel tort
remedy” for medical negligence.7 Or take Wilson v. Libby, in which
Valerie Plame sought relief from the Vice President and his top assistants for disclosing her status as a covert CIA operative.8 The
D.C. Circuit recently held that Plame’s constitutional claims were
barred because a federal statute, the Privacy Act, prohibited the
disclosure of Plame’s identity and provided her with at least some
relief.9 These and other cases10 suggest that where subconstitutional law is available for relief, the Constitution is unavailable. The Constitution, in other words, can be enforced by
proxy.
The emerging practice of proxy enforcement in constitutional
adjudication has yet to command much attention from the legal
academy. This is surprising because the practice sits at the confluence of several important discourses in the federal courts field.
Scholars and jurists have long debated the duty of federal courts to
4
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000) (imposing liability on state agencies, counties, and municipalities for intentional discrimination in employment); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (stating that states will be liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for intentional racial discrimination in employment).
5
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (holding that the use of force during
an arrest will violate the Fourth Amendment where such use is not “objectively reasonable”); Lewis v. Goodie, 798 F. Supp. 382, 390 (W.D. La. 1992) (holding police officer liable for common law battery for use of force during arrest).
6
534 U.S. 61 (2001).
7
Id. at 72–73.
8
535 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
9
Id. at 709.
10
See infra Section I.B.
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issue a remedy for every constitutional wrong,11 the role of nonArticle III actors in setting constitutional norms,12 and the degree
to which sub-constitutional law, like the Constitution itself, is “constitutive” of the national order.13 When the federal courts engage in
proxy enforcement, they withhold constitutional remedies and rely
on sub-constitutional law, thus giving non-Article III actors a more
significant role in crafting constitutional norms. A comprehensive
assessment of the modern practice—which is offered for the first
time in this Article—will thus speak to many audiences and, of
course, invite many responses as well.
This Article’s central claim is that proxy enforcement, properly
administered, is permissible and even advisable in a large number
of cases. The permissibility of the practice turns chiefly on two
conditions: whether Congress has forbidden the practice, and
whether the sub-constitutional law can adequately enforce the constitutional interests at stake. If Congress has not instructed the federal courts otherwise, there is nothing to prevent courts from
choosing sub-constitutional law to achieve constitutionally required ends. The Constitution does not mandate that the federal

11

See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 289 (1995) (arguing that judicial remedies for constitutional wrongs are
compelled); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the
Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 Hastings L.J. 665 (1987) (arguing the
same); Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 777,
861–62 (2004) (arguing that federal courts do not have a duty to remedy every
wrong); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1789 (1991) (arguing that judicial
refusal of remedies for constitutional violations in some instances is “regrettable, but
tolerable”).
12
For scholarship criticizing the exclusion of non-Article III actors from the process
of constitutional interpretation, see Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family
and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943 (2003). For scholarship defending judicial
supremacy in constitutional interpretation, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer,
Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 Const. Comment. 455, 457–58 (2000);
Daniel A. Farber, The Importance of Being Final, 20 Const. Comment. 359 (2003);
Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L.
Rev. 1594, 1629–35 (2005) (book review).
13
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L.J. 1215,
1216–17 (2001); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117
Yale L.J. 408, 424–25 (2007).
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courts issue a constitutional remedy for every constitutional wrong;
it simply requires the courts to “keep government, overall and on
average, tolerably within the bounds of law.”14 If sub-constitutional
law can accomplish this end, then courts are free to use it.
Moreover—and more controversially—federal courts are free to
rely on sub-constitutional laws even if the laws provide rights that
are narrower than constitutional rights, or remedies that are weaker
than constitutional remedies. Proxy enforcement is permissible in
such instances because a large number of what we define as constitutional rights are not actually required by the Constitution, but
rather judicially crafted rules designed to implement underlying
constitutional norms. Such rules are born from the collision of constitutional ambiguity and necessity. The Constitution only vaguely
suggests limits on justiciability, for example, but the Court must design rules to limit its jurisdiction, or else every policy question before Congress will be converted into a lawsuit—a result plainly at
odds with the constitutional design.15 Though the judiciary must design such rules, it necessarily has discretion in defining the rules’
exact contours. Given this discretion, there is nothing to prevent
the judiciary from choosing rules devised by Congress or the states
that vary from judicially devised rules.
Even if courts are free to enforce the Constitution by proxy, why
should they? The chief value of the practice lies in its promise of a
partial truce in the everlasting debate over interpretive supremacy.
Modern constitutional law and scholarship is infatuated with a single, seemingly insoluble question: who controls the meaning of the
Constitution?16 On one side are those who, remembering victory in
Brown, claim that federal courts must retain interpretive supremacy so that core constitutional values can be protected from majoritarian passions. On the other side are those who, remembering defeat in Lochner, claim that federal courts must yield to the
interpretive choices of political branches so that majority prefer14

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review,
and Constitutional Remedies, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 309, 311 (1993).
15
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1274, 1280–97 (2006) (discussing the political question doctrine
in light of the need for enforcement of constitutional norms).
16
Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L.J. 153 (2002) (tracing the history of
this debate).
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ences will be realized. The practice of enforcement by proxy holds
great promise as a mediating force in the inter-branch and intergovernmental struggle over interpretive supremacy. The practice
allows the judiciary to retain its power to check abuses by nonArticle III actors and, at the same time, allows these same entities
a role in particularizing the norms of acceptable government behavior.
Some might find the practice of proxy enforcement undesirable
because it will stymie the development of constitutional law,
squelch public debate on constitutional issues, and be difficult to
administer. These claims mostly fail because proxy enforcement
will not significantly decrease the quantity or nature of constitutional litigation, thus leaving ample opportunities for constitutional
development and debate. The practice will prove difficult, however, where state law is the putative stand-in for the Constitution.
State laws emanate from legislative, executive, and judicial bodies
at the municipal, county, and state-wide level throughout all fifty
states. The sheer volume and heterogeneity of these laws will prevent the development of broadly applicable precedent to guide
courts in future cases, thus requiring courts to analyze each case
anew. This problem does not apply where a federal statute or regulation is the putative stand-in because those laws emanate from a
far more limited number of sources and apply uniformly throughout the nation. Thus, from a normative perspective, proxy enforcement should be practiced using federal, but not state, law.
In the final analysis, Constitution worshipers—whether at the
Archives, in court, or part of the legal academy—should be pleased
with the prospect of constitutional enforcement by proxy. Instead
of dishonoring the Bill of Rights by invoking sub-constitutional
law, the practice honors a right that lies beneath and before every
other right: the right of self-rule. Whatever else it may say, the
Constitution makes clear that the ultimate sovereign is always “the
people themselves.”17 Enforcing the Constitution by proxy affirms
our popular sovereignty without dispensing with our individual
rights—a difficult feat that should impress us all.

17
Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in Writings 123, 274 (Merrill D.
Peterson ed., 1984) (“Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the
people alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe depositories.”).
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I. THE SHIFT FROM DIRECT TOWARDS PROXY ENFORCEMENT
In the United States, law is everywhere. All three branches of
the federal government create law, as do all branches of the fifty
state governments and countless subordinate governments. The resulting multiplicity of laws makes it almost inevitable that some actions will violate multiple laws. When behavior violates the Constitution as well as sub-constitutional law, which law should apply?
Section I.A below explains that sub-constitutional law has traditionally been irrelevant to the availability of a civil rights action
and attributes this practice to historic presumptions about state
courts, state law, and congressional preferences. Section I.B then
describes changes in these presumptions and identifies areas of law
where proxy enforcement has grown in use. This Section does not
posit that proxy enforcement has taken hold in the federal courts,
for it has not. Rather, it only posits that the ideological roadblocks
that historically prevented proxy enforcement have largely disappeared and that the practice has begun to emerge as an alternative
method of constitutional enforcement.
A. Direct Enforcement
In the United States, a person may enforce her constitutional
rights by suing the officer responsible for the deprivation. The exact cause of action available to the plaintiff will depend on the
identity of the officer. Where the officer acts under color of state
law, the plaintiff must bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.18 Where
the officer acts under color of federal law, the plaintiff must bring a
“Bivens action”—so-called because the action was first recognized
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics.19 Bivens actions are creatures of judicial creation and
thus are more flexibly applied than Section 1983 actions.20 In the
modern civil rights era, the traditional rule in Section 1983 and
Bivens cases has been that constitutional rights may be enforced
18

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
20
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (stating that, in determining whether
to recognize a Bivens action, “the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal”) (quoting Bush v. Lucas,
462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).
19
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without regard to whether sub-constitutional law might also provide relief.
Monroe v. Pape nicely illustrates this practice in the Section 1983
setting.21 In Monroe, James Monroe alleged that thirteen Chicago
police officers had, without a warrant or other authority, raided his
house in the early morning, made his family stand naked in the living room, and later held him at the police station for ten hours
without charges or access to an attorney. Monroe brought a civil
rights action under Section 1983. At issue in the case was whether
the officers acted under color of state law, even though they had no
explicit authority or order to act as they did. Seeking to escape liability under Section 1983, the officers argued that Monroe’s true
remedy was under state tort law, not the Federal Constitution. Rejecting this argument, the Court explained:
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would
give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked. Hence the fact that Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures is
22
no barrier to the present suit in the federal court.

Thus, plaintiffs intent on vindicating their constitutional rights
against state officers did not have to resort to sub-constitutional
law first, jointly, or even at all.23 Put differently, a constitutional
right was a freestanding right; it was susceptible to judicial enforcement without regard to which other rights may have been violated.
21

365 U.S. 167 (1961).
Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
23
Though this principle is most often tied to Monroe, it actually predates Monroe
and extends beyond the § 1983 context. For example, in the landmark case Home
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), the Court
held that “conduct of state officials that, prima facie, contravened the [U.S. Constitution] is open to challenge in the district courts without regard to whether that conduct
also violates state law or whether the state provides adequate corrective process.”
Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, State Law Wrongs, State Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 979, 981 (1986); see also Michael Wells,
“Available State Remedies” and the Fourteenth Amendment: Comments on Florida
Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1665, 1667 (2000) (“A central
principle of constitutional law, established in Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, is that the constitutional violation is complete when officials act,
even if their conduct is not authorized by state law.”) (footnote omitted).
22

PREIS PRE PP

1672

10/20/2009 7:31 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 95:1663

Underlying the Court’s decision in Monroe was the belief that
state courts could not be trusted to enforce civil rights. Requiring
civil rights plaintiffs to plead state law claims would typically force
the plaintiffs into state court,24 and state courts, in the opinion of
the Court at least, were possessed of “prejudice, passion, neglect,
[and] intolerance.”25 Thus, to allow plaintiffs to escape this prejudice and take advantage of federal courts’ supposed solicitude for
federal rights, plaintiffs must be permitted to plead federal claims
even where state claims might be available.
A decade after Monroe, the Court applied the same rule to cases
against federal officers. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, a plaintiff brought a Fourth
Amendment claim against several federal officers for unlawfully
searching and seizing him.26 The availability of relief in the case
turned on whether a cause of action should be “implied” from the
Fourth Amendment. As in Monroe, the defendants argued that the
plaintiff may enforce his “rights only by an action in tort, under
state law.”27 Rejecting this argument, the Court explained:
[O]ur cases make clear[] [that] the Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power regardless of whether the State in whose jurisdiction that power is exercised would prohibit or penalize the identical act if engaged in by
a private citizen. It guarantees to citizens of the United States
the absolute right to be free from unreasonable searches and
28
seizures carried out by virtue of federal authority.

Although the Bivens Court adopted the same rule as in Monroe,
its reasoning was different. The Court did not advert to any
“prejudice, passion, neglect, [or] intolerance” in state courts, presumably because common law actions against federal officers will
24
Because civil rights violations usually occur at the local level, the plaintiff and defendant are typically citizens of the same state, thus precluding federal diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). Although common law suits against government officers often involve federal questions, these questions typically arise as a defense, thus
precluding federal question jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule. 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
25
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180. The classical scholarly citation for this view is Burt
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977).
26
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
27
Id. at 390.
28
Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
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almost always occur in federal court.29 Rather, the Court opined
that state tort law might be “inconsistent or even hostile” to federal
civil rights.30 This “inconsistency” or “hostility” stemmed from the
fact that tort law, though ostensibly similar to constitutional law in
that it regulates the imposition of physical force, rarely mirrored
constitutional law from a doctrinal perspective. This entails the risk
that tort claims would not actually yield relief for civil rights plaintiffs. In Bivens itself, for example, the Court doubted that a trespass action by Bivens would be successful because the claim was
susceptible to the defense of consent (based upon the fact that Bivens allowed the officers, upon their demand, to enter his apartment).31
Both Monroe and Bivens dealt with the role of state law in federal constitutional actions. As the corpus of federal statutory law
slowly grew, however, courts were naturally presented with cases
where federal statutory and constitutional rights overlapped. In
these cases, the role of statutory rights has depended on congressional intent. Where the Court believes that Congress intended to
supplement constitutional rights with statutory rights, the statutory
rights will have no role in determining whether a constitutional
cause of action exists. In contrast, where the Court believed that
Congress intended to replace a constitutional cause of action with a
statutory cause of action, the Court has yielded to congressional
preferences. Of course, congressional intent is not easy to discern,
and the Court’s decision in any case is likely to reflect its presumptions about congressional behavior and the judicial role in protecting constitutional rights. For much of the twentieth century, the
Court, generally speaking, viewed itself as indispensable in protecting rights and assumed that Congress would not lightly replace a

29
Common law claims against federal officers can be filed in state court, but almost
always are litigated in federal court because federal officers sued for acts taken within
the scope of their employment have the right to remove the action to federal court. 28
U.S.C. § 1442 (2006); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 271 (1879) (holding that criminal cases for alleged offences against state laws may be removed from state courts to
federal court if a federal question arises in them).
30
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394.
31
Id. (“A private citizen, asserting no authority other than his own, will not normally be liable in trespass if he demands, and is granted, admission to another’s
house.”) (citing 1 Fowler V. Harper & Fleming James, Jr., The Law of Torts § 1.11
(1956)).
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constitutional cause of action with a statutory one. This attitude led
to decisions like Carlson v. Green, where the Court held that a federal prisoner may prosecute an Eighth Amendment claim in a
Bivens action, even though the misbehavior alleged might also be
actionable under the Federal Tort Claims Act.32
In sum, the traditional rule in federal civil rights actions has been
to allow plaintiffs to bring constitutional claims even where analogous state law or federal statutory claims were also available. Depending on the nature of the case, this rule has been based on three
separate beliefs: (1) that state courts cannot be trusted to enforce
civil rights, (2) that state law will only imperfectly enforce federal
rights, and (3) that Congress has explicitly or implicitly approved
multiple avenues of enforcement. As the next Section explains, a
change in these beliefs over the past several decades has coincided
with a shift in the role of sub-constitutional law in civil rights actions.
B. Proxy Enforcement
Over the past several decades, the Court’s beliefs that give rise
to its direct enforcement decisions have undergone significant revisions. These revisions, in turn, appear to have precipitated a shift
away from direct, and towards proxy, enforcement. In this Section,
I briefly explain these revisions and then illustrate this shift
through a discussion of recent cases.
Not long after it condemned state courts as bastions of “prejudice, passion, neglect, [or] intolerance,” the Supreme Court
changed its tune. In 1971, for example, the Burger Court expressed
its “unwilling[ness] to assume that there now exists a general lack
of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and
appellate courts of the several States.”33 Later cases contain similar
appellations and, whatever the truth of the assertion, the modern
Court continues to believe that state courts are adequate protectors of civil rights.34
32

446 U.S. 14, 19–20 (1980) (preserving a Bivens action even where the plaintiff
could bring an FTCA claim because “it [is] crystal clear that Congress views FTCA
and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action”).
33
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976).
34
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980) (allowing state court decisions to have
preclusive effect in federal court because, by giving the “parties a full and fair oppor-
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Nor has the Court persisted in its wholesale skepticism of state
law’s capacity to enforce federal rights. In Bivens cases, therefore,
the Court now evaluates each case individually to determine
whether state law is likely to provide the plaintiff with an alternative remedy. Thus, in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, the
Court considered whether a Bivens claim against a halfway house
should be permitted even though the plaintiff could have brought a
claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act.35 Responding to the argument in Bivens that state law was often “inconsistent or even
hostile” to federal rights, the Court explained that “[s]uch logic
does not apply” to the instant case.36 Indeed, the Court noted that
state law may be more beneficial to plaintiffs than federal constitutional law because tort law only requires proof of simple negligence, whereas the Eighth Amendment requires a showing of reckless disregard—“a state of mind more blameworthy than
negligence.”37 Therefore, while future cases may arise where state
law will be hostile to federal constitutional rights, it is now clear
that such hostility is evaluated on a case-by-case basis, thus opening the door to proxy enforcement in individual cases.
Finally, the Court has also changed its views about congressional
intent in creating federal statutory rights. This is most apparent
with regard to Bivens actions, for which the Court no longer presumes that Congress intends statutory causes of action to be supplementary. The Court now sees Bivens actions as federal common
law and thus presumptively susceptible to legislative override.38 As
a corollary, even the most basic of statutory remedies can now dis-

tunity to litigate federal claims,” the state court “has shown itself willing and able to
protect federal rights”); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975) (“Appellee
is in truth urging us to base a rule on the assumption that state judges will not be
faithful to their constitutional responsibilities. This we refuse to do.”); Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–45 (1971) (refusing to intervene in state proceedings based in
part on the implicit assumption that states can be trusted to adhere to federal constitutional mandates).
35
534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001).
36
Id. at 73–74.
37
Id. at 73 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)).
38
See, e.g., id. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting a Bivens action by referring to
Bivens as “a relic of the heady days in which [the] Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action”).
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place the Bivens action.39 Such a shift is not apparent in the Section
1983 context, however, since Section 1983 is not a judicially created
cause of action and is thus much less susceptible to legislative override.40
Thus, the beliefs that supported the practice of direct enforcement during the civil rights era no longer have the currency they
once had. One might expect, therefore, to see a shift from direct
towards proxy enforcement as well. Summarized below are recent
decisions illustrating this shift, divided according to the type of subconstitutional law involved: state law or federal statutory law.
1. State Law as Proxy
The most common type of state law used to protect federal constitutional rights is tort law. This makes sense, since many unconstitutional actions are also tortious. Eighth Amendment cases illustrate this most readily. In Malesko, for example, a prisoner in a
federal halfway house brought a Bivens suit after he suffered a
heart attack allegedly caused by the halfway house’s refusal to accommodate his medical needs.41 Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained that Bivens actions were available
only to plaintiffs who “lacked any alternative remedy.”42 Malesko
was not without a remedy, however, because he “enjoy[ed] a parallel tort remedy”—presumably one for negligent care.43 In a break
with the traditional rule ignoring sub-constitutional law, the Court
refused to recognize Malesko’s action. Since Malesko, the lower
courts have seized on Chief Justice Rehnquist’s “any alternative
remedy” language, repeatedly denying Bivens actions in Eighth
Amendment cases.44
39

Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983) (holding that a statutory scheme offering
less than complete relief for a First Amendment violation could displace a Bivens action).
40
See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788 (2009) (holding that
plaintiff could maintain an Equal Protection claim under § 1983 despite having a
cause of action under Title IX).
41
534 U.S. 61, 64–65 (2001).
42
Id. at 70 (emphasis in original).
43
Id. at 72–73.
44
See, e.g., Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1254–56 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that
a prisoner could not pursue a Bivens action because an alternative state tort remedy
was available); Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 295–97 (4th Cir. 2006) (refusing to grant a
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The preclusion of Bivens actions by tort law is not limited to the
Eighth Amendment context. For instance, in Wilkie v. Robbins, the
Supreme Court considered a series of Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims by a rancher against several federal officials.45 The officials, the rancher alleged, had exacted retribution on him for failing to grant the federal government an easement over his land. The
retribution took the form of, among other things, baseless prosecutions and illegal entry on his land.46 For each of these alleged constitutional wrongs, the Court “assess[ed] the significance of any alternative remedies.”47 In the Court’s view, the plaintiff could likely
remedy the unfounded prosecutions through a malicious prosecution action and the illegal entry through a trespass action. These
“alternative remedies” suggested that a Bivens action should not
be implied.48
The Tenth Circuit recently reached a similar conclusion on a
Sixth Amendment right to counsel claim. In Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers, a federal inmate alleged that prison officers had
tapped his phone conversations with his attorney, thus effectively
denying him the right to an attorney.49 Relying chiefly on Malesko,
Bivens claim to a prisoner who possessed an alternative remedy under the state law of
negligence); Irabor v. Perry County Corr. Ctr., No. 06-0483-BH-C, 2008 WL 1929965,
at *2–*4 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 30, 2008) (holding that a prisoner could not maintain a
Bivens action for denial of “basic necessities such as socks, toilet paper, and soap” because “adequate state tort remedies [were] available, . . . including, but not limited to,
negligence and wantonness”); Kundra v. Johnson, No. H-06-710, 2006 WL 1061913, at
*3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2006) (holding that a Bivens action is not required against employees of a privately run prison “where state law provides [the plaintiff] with an effective remedy”) (citing Holly, 434 F.3d at 296); Brown v. Pugh, No. CV 306-25, 2006
WL 2439859, at *2–*3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2006) (holding that the plaintiff could not
bring a Bivens suit against employees of a privately run prison where state court
remedies were available); Pollard v. Wackenhut Corr. Corp., No. CV F 01 6078 OWW
WMW P, 2006 WL 2661111, at *3–*4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2006) (holding the same).
45
551 U.S. 537 (2007).
46
Id. at 551.
47
Id.
48
Though the Court ultimately declined to dispose of the case on alternative remedy
grounds (choosing instead to deny the Bivens action based on “special factors”), it is
clear from the Court’s opinion that state tort law suits do have the power to displace a
Bivens remedy. Id. at 562. As precedent for its analysis of state tort remedies, the
Court relied on Malesko’s “consider[ation of the] availability of state tort remedies in
refusing to recognize a Bivens remedy.” Id. at 551.
49
422 F.3d 1090, 1094 (10th Cir. 2005), vacated en banc, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir.
2006). Though the Peoples opinion is emblematic of the role of tort law in constitutional tort actions, its precedential value is probably weak. After holding that the state
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the court reasoned that “the sole purpose [of a Bivens action is] ‘to
provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual
officers.’”50 Thus, “a Bivens claim should not be implied unless the
plaintiff has no other means of redress . . . arising under either state
or federal law.”51 In this case, the plaintiff’s Bivens claim was precluded because “Kansas law provides an alternative cause of action”—namely, a cause of action for “intrusion upon seclusion.”52
As the above examples illustrate, tort law is well suited for use in
proxy enforcement cases. Many constitutional violations involve
the imposition of force on another, which is a central focus of tort
law. The logic supporting these decisions, however, is not confined
to tort law; rather, the logic suggests that any type of state law
could be a sufficient proxy. Indeed, it would seem that state constitutional law will often lend itself to use in proxy enforcement cases.
State constitutions contain many of the same provisions contained
in the Federal Constitution and state courts routinely rely on federal constitutional precedent in interpreting analogous state provisions.53 Similarly, state statutes and administrative regulations often
guarantee citizens due process and equality, mimicking various
constitutional rights.54 Thus, although the role of state law in proxy
enforcement has thus far only involved tort law, a large variety of
state laws are likely available should courts wish to invoke them.

law cause of action displaced the Bivens action, the Tenth Circuit reheard the case en
banc, splitting evenly on the issue. As a result, the original panel opinion was vacated.
Despite the vacatur, however, the original Peoples opinion has played a significant
role in this area. Courts relied on its reasoning prior to the vacatur, and inexplicably,
have continued to rely on it as good law even after the vacatur. See, e.g., Holly, 434
F.3d at 301 n.3 (relying on Peoples prior to its vacatur); Bender v. Gen. Servs. Admin.,
539 F. Supp. 2d 702, 708–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (relying on Peoples after its vacatur).
Peoples is thus an important case to note in this field, even if its authority is questionable.
50
Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1102 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
51
Id. at 1103.
52
Id. at 1105, 1108 (citing Kan. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 93-93 (1993)).
53
See James A. Gardner, Interpreting State Constitutions: A Jurisprudence of Function in a Federal System 42–52 (2005) (discussing state courts’ “lockstep” method of
interpreting state constitutional provisions that resemble federal constitutional provisions).
54
See, e.g., California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12900
(West 2005); New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290–301 (McKinney
2005 & Supp. 2009).
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2. Federal Law as Proxy
Sometimes a civil rights action is displaced not by the promise of
relief under state law, but by the promise of relief under a federal
statute or regulation. Smith v. Robinson is a good example.55 In
Smith, parents of a child with cerebral palsy sued a school district
for discriminating against their child. They alleged a violation of
the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) as well as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The EHA “establishe[d] an enforceable substantive right to a free appropriate public education.”56 This right was, in turn, enforced through an
“elaborate procedural mechanism to protect the rights of handicapped children. The procedures . . . ensure[d] that hearings conducted by the State [were] fair and adequate.”57 The issue in Smith
was whether the plaintiffs could pursue an Equal Protection claim
under Section 1983 simultaneously with an EHA claim. The Court
answered the question in the negative, chiefly because “Congress
intended the EHA to be the exclusive avenue through which a
plaintiff may assert an equal protection claim to a publicly financed
special education.”58
Wilson v. Libby is a more recent example.59 On July 14, 2003, the
Washington Post printed a column by Robert Novak stating that
Valerie Plame “is [a Central Intelligence] [A]gency operative on
weapons of mass destruction.”60 Prior to this column, Plame’s status
55

468 U.S. 992 (1984).
Id. at 1010.
57
Id. at 1010–11.
58
Id. at 1009. This holding bears resemblance to the more popular doctrine established in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association,
453 U.S. 1 (1981), in which the Court held that § 1983 was unavailable to vindicate a
statutory right because Congress had, elsewhere in the statute, made clear that enforcement of the right was to occur under the terms of the statute. Smith and Middlesex cases differ in an important respect, however. In Middlesex cases, the court need
not determine whether the right to be vindicated through § 1983 is “virtually identical” to the right vindicated through the statutory mechanism. Because the statute creates the right, they are exactly the same. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980)
(holding that federal statutory rights are enforceable in § 1983 actions). In contrast,
Smith cases require a court to determine the “virtual identical[ity]” of the constitutional right and the statutory right. In this sense, Smith implicitly holds that Congress
may preempt a suit for a constitutional violation by creating a statutory right that is
“virtually identical.”
59
535 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
60
Robert D. Novak, Mission to Niger, Wash. Post, July 14, 2003, at A21.
56
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as an undercover agent was secret. Novak’s column thus “outed”
Plame and ended her career as a secret agent. Plame believed that
top officials in President Bush’s administration—including Vice
President Richard Cheney, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Karl Rove,
and Richard Armitage—deliberately leaked Plame’s covert status
to punish her husband’s prior disloyalty to the Bush administration.61 She and her husband, Joseph Wilson, thus sued these officials under Bivens for several constitutional deprivations.62
At issue in Wilson was whether a Bivens action was available to
the Wilsons for their various claims. The defendants argued that
such an action was not available because the Privacy Act—a federal statute that prohibits the disclosure of federal employee information in a variety of circumstances, including those present in
the Wilsons’ case—was a “comprehensive remedial scheme.”
Though allegedly “comprehensive,” the Privacy Act has several
gaps. For instance, the Act only provides a damages remedy to the
“person whose records are actually disclosed.”63 Because Joseph
Wilson’s own records were not disclosed, he had no cause of action
under the Act. Additionally, the Act specifically exempts the Offices of the President and Vice President from its coverage.64 Thus
Valerie Plame’s claims against Cheney, Libby, and Rove would fail
as a threshold matter.
Despite these gaps in the Privacy Act, the D.C. Circuit nonetheless held that the Privacy Act was a “comprehensive remedial
scheme” that displaces any remedy available through Bivens. Wil-

61

Such disloyalty was allegedly evidenced by an op-ed in the New York Times in
which Joseph Wilson refuted President Bush’s earlier claim in a State of the Union
address that Saddam Hussein had “recently sought significant quantities of uranium
from Africa.” Joseph C. Wilson 4th, Op-Ed., What I Didn’t Find in Africa, N.Y.
Times, July 6, 2003, § 6, at 9.
62
Wilson, 535 F.3d at 703. The Wilsons also brought claims under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. These claims were dismissed for the Wilson’s failure to timely exhaust
their administrative remedies. Id.
63
Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also 5
U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (2006).
64
5 U.S.C § 552a(a)(1) (2006) (adopting definition of “agency” used in the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA)); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980) (holding that the Office of the President is not an “agency”
under FOIA); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d
20, 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (relying on Kissinger to hold that the Office of the Vice President is not an “agency” under FOIA).
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son is not a recent aberration, however. Courts have also found
“comprehensive remedial schemes” to displace constitutional actions in a wide variety of circumstances, including access to information,65 veterans’ benefits,66 federal employee rights,67 tax refunds,68 and numerous other situations.69
II. IS PROXY ENFORCEMENT PERMISSIBLE?
Federal courts possess an enormous amount of discretion, but it
is not boundless.70 There are thus some things that federal courts
simply must do. This Part assesses whether enforcing the Constitution by proxy violates any judicial duty, thus making it an impermissible practice. Section II.A explains the judicial duties implicated by this question—the duties to implement constitutional
norms and follow congressional preferences. Section II.B explains
the role courts may give to Congress or the states in discharging
their judicial duties. Section II.C explains that, in light of the judi65

Johnson v. Executive Office for U.S. Att’ys, 310 F.3d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(holding that FOIA displaced a Fifth Amendment access-to-information claim).
66
Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 975–76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the Veterans Judicial Review Act precluded a Bivens claim challenging medical care provided
by a Veterans Affairs hospital).
67
Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 858 (7th Cir. 1989) (declining to extend Bivens remedy
for constitutional challenges to minor personnel actions governed by the Civil Service
Reform Act); Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (refusing a
Bivens action where relief under the Civil Service Reform Act was available); DalyMurphy v. Winston, 820 F.2d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a Veterans Affairs employee’s Bivens claim was precluded by the availability of other meaningful
statutory and administrative remedies); Braun v. United States, 707 F.2d 922, 926 (6th
Cir. 1983) (holding that an IRS employee had no Bivens claim in part because there
were alternative remedies available).
68
Shreiber v. Mastrogiovanni, 214 F.3d 148, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2000).
69
For a catalogue of federal statutory programs that have been held to preclude a
Bivens action, see Practicing Law Institute, New Developments in Civil Rights Litigation and Trends in Section 1983 Actions, 665 Litig. & Admin. Prac. 869, 1093–94
(2001).
70
The classic article on judicial discretion in the federal courts is David L. Shapiro,
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985). Throughout this Article, I
focus on proxy enforcement from the perspective of the federal judiciary. I adopt the
view of the federal judiciary mainly for ease of explanation and do not mean to suggest that proxy enforcement will not or should not occur in state courts. State courts
will be obliged to adhere to whatever rule of enforcement is chosen by the Supreme
Court. See Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1024, 1073–79 (1967) (explaining that federal common
law binds state courts via the Supremacy Clause).
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cial duties identified in Section II.A and the possibility for congressional or state input identified in Section II.B, federal courts are
therefore free to apply sub-constitutional law in civil rights actions,
provided that the sub-constitutional law would uphold constitutional norms. Finally, Section II.D, which offers several illustrations of this analysis in practice.
A. Federal Judicial Duty
Federal courts serve many roles in our constitutional system.
Chief among them, however, is the maintenance of the constitutional order by requiring non-Article III actors (Congress, the Executive, and the states) to adhere to constitutional norms. At the
same time, federal courts are courts and thus must do what any
court does: follow the applicable law. In this Section, I explain that
federal courts have a duty to craft judicial doctrine so that constitutional norms will remain effectual, as well as a duty to follow valid
congressional directives. I reject, however, any claim that federal
courts have a mandatory duty to right every constitutional wrong.
1. Implementing the Constitution
The founding generation, having suffered the pains of colonial
rule, was dedicated to the preservation of individual liberty.71 Although the Bill of Rights is now seen as the font of liberty, this was
not always so. Indeed, during that hot summer of 1787, delegates to
the Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected inclusion of a bill
of rights in the new constitution.72 For the Founders, liberty was to
be secured through the structuring of government, not through a
declaration of individual rights. Rights were not irrelevant, of
course—a fact amply illustrated by the prompt adoption of the Bill
of Rights in 1791. But enumerated rights could never protect liberty on their own; such rights would amount to little more than
“parchment barriers” if government were not properly structured
71
The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men . . . .”)
(emphasis added); The Federalist No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (tying institutional design to the “preservation of liberty”).
72
2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 649 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
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to give them effect.73 Thus, the “structure of the government is a vital part of a constitutional organism whose final cause is the protection of individual rights.”74
The animating features of the Constitution’s structure have been
rehearsed innumerable times and need not be repeated en toto
here. For the present purposes, it is enough to note two essential
structural choices. One is the separation of powers. Steeped in the
political writings of John Locke and Baron de Montesquieu,75 the
Founders believed that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”76 The Founders therefore created a government where one branch would be charged
with making law, one with executing law, and one with resolving
individual disputes of law.
Separating raw power into its constituent parts, though necessary to protect liberty, was not sufficient to secure it. If an individual branch transgressed its enumerated powers and other branches
had no ability to counteract the transgression, a balanced government could hardly be maintained. Thus, the Founders created
mechanisms whereby each branch “may be a check on the other.”77
73
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 The Writings of James Madison 269, 272 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904) (referring to enumerated
rights as “parchment barriers” and explaining that “the real power [to oppress] lies in
the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but
from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of
the Constituents”); see also Antonin Scalia, Foreword: The Importance of Structure
in Constitutional Interpretation, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1417, 1418 (2008) (stating
that, when it comes to protecting liberty, “[s]tructure is everything”).
74
Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1513, 1514 (1991); see also David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of The Federalist 45
(1984) (“The Federalist insists that the real protection against abuse is to be found not
in any limitation of the government’s powers but in the government’s structure, in
how it is ‘modeled.’”).
75
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (“Even a cursory examination of the
Constitution reveals the influence of Montesquieu’s thesis that checks and balances
were the foundation of a structure of government that would protect liberty.”); M.J.C.
Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 72–74 (1998) (characterizing
Locke as “the Father of the United States Constitution” with regard to dividing sovereign power into its executive and legislative components).
76
The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 71, at 301.
77
The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 71, at 322; see also Garry
Wills, Explaining America: The Federalist 119 (1981) (“Checks and balances have to
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The President was granted authority to veto bills and appoint
judges; Congress was empowered to impeach judges and executive
officials; et cetera. And with regard to the courts, “the Founders . . . positioned the judiciary to keep the political branches
within the bounds of their lawful authority.”78 Yet, the judiciary
was also positioned to keep the states—given as they were to
“populist, parochial passions”79—within the bounds of law as well.80
Thus, for the Constitution to work—for it truly to protect liberty—the federal courts must fulfill their structural role of superintending Congress, the Executive, and the states. But how is the judiciary to discharge this duty? Perhaps the best place to begin is
with Chief Justice Marshall’s celebrated claim that it is the “duty of
do with corrective invasion of the separated powers . . . .”). For an explanation of
these checks, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A
Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 393, 427–34 (1996).
78
Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1239, 1283 (2002); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704
(1974) (“Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion interpret
the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by
another branch.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Fallon & Meltzer,
supra note 11, at 1788 (“The Constitution thus contemplates a judicial ‘check’ on the
political branches not merely to redress particular violations, but to ensure that government generally respects constitutional values—one of the hallmarks of the rule of
law.”). For originalist defenses of judicial review, see Randy E. Barnett, The Original
Meaning of Judicial Power, 12 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 115 (2004); Saikrishna B. Prakash
& John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 887 (2003). For a
recent structural defense of judicial review, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an
Uneasy Case For Judicial Review, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1693 (2008).
79
James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity
and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 Colum. L. Rev.
696, 709 (1998); see also Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, A History of the
American Constitution 18–23 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining that the “excesses of democracy” in the states underlay the design of the Constitution); Jack N. Rakove, James
Madison and the Creation of the American Republic 44–52 (1990) (explaining the difficulty of controlling states under the Articles of Confederation).
80
This was accomplished through use of the Supremacy Clause. U.S. Const. art. VI;
Liebman & Ryan, supra note 79, at 729–31; Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 Geo L.J. 1061, 1068–69 (2007) (“The significance
of the Supremacy Clause cannot be understated. It not only confirmed the status of
the Constitution as fundamental law, but it also made the enforcement of its essential
division of power between the Union and the States an inherently judicial function.
Rather than give the national government the power to coerce States to do their duty,
or abrogate the residual sovereignty of the States by subjecting their laws to prior
congressional approval, the Constitution made the judiciary the first responders to
disputes over the boundaries of federalism.”).
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the judicial department to say what the law is.”81 According to this
description of judicial duty, federal courts “lay the article of the
Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and . . . decide whether the latter squares with the former.”82
If, for example, Congress enacts a statute setting the minimum age
for U.S. Senators at thirty-five years old, and a thirty-two-year-old
elected by her state is refused a seat in the Senate, the court’s duty
in an ensuing lawsuit is straightforward: the court must “say” that
the Constitution requires only that Senators have “attained to the
Age of thirty Years” and that the statute is therefore ineffectual.83
By holding as such, the court preserves liberty in the general sense
by keeping the legislature within its bounds. It resists those who
would ignore the limits of their authority.
“Saying what the law is” is rarely as simple as the preceding example, of course. When presented with questions implicating the
Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, or the speech
and religion clauses, for example, “lawsaying” is a more difficult
enterprise.84 In these circumstances, simply reading the Constitution will never be enough to answer the question presented. Until
recently, battles over judicial lawsaying were waged primarily in
terms of interpretation. Constitutional decisions could be justified,
or not, depending on whether one was an intentionalist or an
originalist, among other types.85 In recent years, however, the focus

81

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936); see also Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
at 178 (“[I]f both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the
court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of
judicial duty.”).
83
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained
to the Age of thirty Years . . . .”).
84
Kermit Roosevelt III, Judicial Supremacy, Judicial Activism: Cooper v. Aaron and
Parents Involved, 52 St. Louis U. L.J. 1191, 1192 (2008) (“[L]aying an article of the
Constitution beside a statute achieves nothing in any but the most trivial case.”); id. at
1192 n.14 (“[L]aying down the Equal Protection Clause will not take a court very far,
while laying down an ‘ink blot’ such as the Ninth Amendment or the Privileges and
Immunities Clause may make things worse.”).
85
For a recent accounting of various methods of constitutional interpretation, see
Symposium, Essays on Originalism, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 901 (2008).
82
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has shifted from interpretation to implementation86—based in great
part upon the observation that no theory of interpretation could,
according to its own terms, accomplish what the Constitution requires the judiciary to accomplish: “keep[ing] the political branches
within the bounds of their lawful authority.”87
Take, for example, the question of custodial interrogations. The
Fifth Amendment prohibits the state from “compel[ling] [a suspect] in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”88 By any
fair reading, the Amendment prohibits states from physically coercing suspects to confess. For many years, courts determined
whether a confession was coerced based on the “totality of circumstances.”89 The defendant and the state would present evidence
proving or disproving the use of force, threats, intimidation, etc.
Quite predictably, these were difficult decisions for courts. There
was rarely any physical evidence and all witnesses—the officers
and the defendant—were highly biased. Moreover, in many cases,
the state’s witnesses were likely to be familiar to the presiding
judge, thus raising the specter of judicial bias. Trial court decisions
could be appealed, of course, but deferential standards of review
precluded any meaningful scrutiny. In short, this doctrinal scheme
carried with it a considerable risk that widespread police coercion
would take hold.
Enter Miranda v. Arizona.90 In that case, the Court held that an
interrogation not preceded by certain warnings would be deemed
per se coerced. Whatever its normative value, the decision can
hardly be characterized as an “interpretation” of the Fifth
Amendment. Yet, at the same time, the ruling was constitutionally
required: the Constitution clearly prohibits coercive interrogations
and the pre-Miranda doctrine was insufficient to check such mis-

86
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution 37 (2001) (“If we
had to choose one word to characterize the proper role of the Supreme Court in constitutional adjudication, it should not be ‘interpretation,’ but ‘implementation.’”).
87
Molot, supra note 78, at 1283; see also Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme
Court, 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 45, 66–67 (1981)
(interpreting congressional authority to regulate federal jurisdiction so as not to defeat the judiciary’s “essential function” in the constitutional system).
88
U.S. Const. amend. V.
89
See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963).
90
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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behavior. To stand idle while Fifth Amendment guarantees were
being violated would amount to an abdication of judicial duty.
Thus, if we are to take seriously the judiciary’s structural role in
holding non-judicial actors accountable, we must accept that the
judiciary will often craft rules that implement constitutional guarantees, even if those rules cannot be ordinarily described as the
product of “interpretation.” In other words, constitutional supervision may not operate according to the strict terms of the Constitution—an observation that opens the door to the use of subconstitutional law in constitutional enforcement.
This is not to say that the judiciary has carte blanche to enforce
the constitutional order in any manner it chooses. The Supreme
Court could hardly dispatch a roving band of U.S. Marshals to sit
in on police interrogations. But, the judiciary is free to act as a judiciary. Federal courts, the Supreme Court has recognized, are free
to act in ways “traditionally done in order to accomplish their assigned tasks.”91 Thus, federal courts may decide cases through the
application of law, precedent, and traditional forms of legal reasoning.92 For hundreds of years, courts have created and relied on judicial tools such as bright-line rules, evidentiary presumptions, and
standards of review.93 These and other such rules are rarely dictated by any legal text, but are usually created to better achieve
91
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 58 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 124 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As with any
inherent judicial power . . . we should exercise [our remedial powers] in a manner
consistent with our history and traditions.”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent
Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 741
(2001) (stating that the judicial power is limited to those practices “rooted in historical
Anglo-American practice”).
92
2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 72, at 430 (Aug. 27,
1787) (statement of James Madison) (expressing conviction that only “cases of a Judiciary Nature” be allocated to the judicial department, lest the judiciary improperly
interfere with political decisions); 1 The Works of James Wilson 296 (Robert G.
McCloskey ed., 1967) (“The judicial power consists in applying, according to the principles of right and justice, the constitution and laws to facts and transactions in
cases. . . .”); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a
“Golden Parachute,” 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 1397, 1414 (2005) (“By using the word
‘judges,’ however, the Constitution incorporates the essential powers and duties of a
judge, as understood at the founding.”).
93
See Fallon, supra note 86, at 78–79 (cataloguing doctrinal tests that cannot be
traced to constitutional text, including “forbidden content tests,” “suspect-content
tests,” “balancing tests,” “non-suspect-content tests,” “effects tests,” “purpose tests,”
and “appropriate deliberation tests”).
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some legal end. The creation of a per se rule in Miranda was an entirely ordinary judicial act. Indeed, those who have studied judicial
behavior closely explain that such acts are “the norm, not the exception.”94
Miranda is thus one example of the duty of constitutional implementation—the duty to craft judicial doctrine so that constitutional norms will, on the whole, be maintained. No doubt, there are
many who will deny the legitimacy of implementation, decrying its
atextual nature and ends-oriented methodology.95 These criticisms
are susceptible to an important retort, however: the Constitution
does not mandate any particular method of interpretation, but does
require the judiciary “to ensure that government generally respects
constitutional values—one of the hallmarks of the rule of law.”96
Put differently, whatever method of interpretation the judiciary
deems appropriate, that method must make the Constitution real—
it must lead to rules that stand in the way of, rather than countenance, widespread police coercion. Courts may not hide behind
sub-constitutional theories of interpretation while constitutional
disorder slowly unfolds around them.97

94

David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190, 195
(1988) (“Constitutional law is filled with rules that are justified in ways that are analytically indistinguishable from the justifications for the Miranda rules.”); see also
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1, 61–78 (2004)
(offering numerous illustrations for the proposition that such rules are a “ubiquitous
component of constitutional doctrine”).
95
Even originalists, however, admit that original public meaning sometimes cannot
always resolve a case on its own. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001)
(Scalia, J.) (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning,
Original Intent, and Judicial Review 7 (1999) (admitting that, “[r]egardless of the extent of judicial interpretation of certain aspects of the Constitution, there will remain
an impenetrable sphere of meaning that cannot be simply discovered [through interpretation]” and that courts, at that point, must “construct” the text’s meaning).
96
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 11, at 1788.
97
See Fallon, supra note 86, at 18 (“Even if we accept that [the Constitution] is exclusively the written Constitution that the Court should interpret or implement, it
does not necessarily follow that interpretive norms should be based solely on the
Constitution’s text, heedless of the way courts have interpreted the Constitution over
time. To determine what needs to be interpreted is one thing; to identify applicable
norms of interpretation may be something else.”). I do not intend this point as a facial
attack on originalist theories of constitutional interpretation. Rather, I simply challenge its use in situations that would lead to the inevitable breakdown of the constitu-
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2. Implementing Congressional Preferences
The judiciary’s obligation to superintend the constitutional order
is not exclusive. Congress must also take care to enforce constitutional norms rather than contradict them.98 Where Congress attempts to promote constitutional values through a statute, the judiciary will thus be presented with the choice between implementing
the Constitution on terms chosen by the judiciary or on terms chosen by Congress. This situation implicates a second type of judicial
duty: the duty to implement congressional preferences. Under this
duty, the judiciary must give effect to all validly enacted federal
statutes.
Thus, if Congress orders federal courts to enforce the Constitution directly, without regard to whether sub-constitutional law
might also provide relief, the courts must obey this command.
Conversely, if Congress orders federal courts to rely on subconstitutional law when available, even in cases where constitutional law would also apply, the courts must obey this edict as
well.99
Of course, these statutory commands are only binding if they are
in fact constitutional. It should go without saying that statutory
commands can be constitutionally infirm for a multitude of reasons. Generally speaking, statutes will be invalid if they impinge on
an individual right (for example, the free exercise of religion) or
address a subject outside Congress’ power to regulate (for example, wholly intrastate commerce). Of particular import in proxy en-

tional order. Where such circumstances are not presented, the validity of originalism
is completely unaffected by the arguments presented herein.
For further observations on the interaction between originalism and constitutional
implementation, see infra notes 142–147 and accompanying text.
98
Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation,
27 Stan. L. Rev. 585, 587 (1975) (relying in part on constitutional text to justify the
“self-evident” proposition that “legislators are obligated to determine, as best they
can, the constitutionality of proposed legislation” and refrain from enacting unconstitutional laws); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1227 (1978) (“At a minimum, the
obligation of public officials in this context, as in any other, is one of ‘best efforts’ to
avoid unconstitutional conduct.”).
99
One might challenge this claim by arguing that federal courts have a duty to issue
a remedy for every constitutional violation. As I explain in the following Subsection,
this challenge is not justified. See infra Subsection II.A.3.
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forcement cases, congressional power is limited by the “judicial
power” granted to the federal courts in Article III.100
A short example will illustrate this. Suppose Congress enacts a
federal statute creating free speech rights and then amends Section
1983 by excluding free speech claims from its coverage. The federal
statute, however, prohibits courts from issuing injunctive relief,
limits damages to $100, and prohibits successful plaintiffs from recovering attorney’s fees. The federal statute, in other words, severely curtails remedies for free speech violations and thus creates
a significant risk of widespread speech deprivation. This statute—
which essentially replaces direct enforcement via Section 1983 with
proxy enforcement via a federal statute—would likely be constitutionally infirm. This statute would essentially force the federal
courts to sit idly by while the First Amendment is rendered a nullity, a prospect that subverts the structural choices underlying the
Constitution. While Congress has the authority to strip the courts
of jurisdiction, it does not have the power to handicap the courts in
such a way as to divest them of their essential structural functions.101
I do not argue here that all statutes limiting judicial remedies
would be constitutionally suspect, though that argument may have
significant force.102 A statute that limits damages in free speech
cases to $500,000 would not likely endanger the constitutional order, even though at least some plaintiffs would have their remedies
100

U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.”); Liebman & Ryan, supra note 79, at 708 (explaining that
the grant of “judicial Power” to the federal judiciary in Article III limits congressional
power to curtail core judicial practices).
101
Although some believe that Congress enjoys complete control over judicial
remedies, see generally John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 Geo. L.J. 2513 (1998), others argue that federal courts have
core remedial powers ancillary to their Article III grant of “judicial Power.” See, e.g.,
David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial
Branch, 1999 BYU L. Rev. 75, 170 (1999) (arguing that federal courts have autonomous remedial power because remedies are “the most fundamental and essential
element of judicial power”); Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional
Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 Const. Comment. 191, 226 (2001) (arguing that Congress may not curtail judicial remedies); Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress,
Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 Geo. L.J. 2537 (1998) (defending judicial
power over remedies).
102
Engdahl, supra note 101, at 170; Lawson, supra note 101, at 226.
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curtailed. Similarly, a statute that shifts certain types of constitutional adjudications out of the federal courts and into administrative tribunals might not risk the constitutional order, provided appropriate safeguards were put in place.103 What matters to my
analysis here is not necessarily whether judicial power is limited in
any particular way, but whether that limit is likely to place the constitutional order at risk. Where limits are imposed, but a risk of
constitutional disorder is not created, the statute will be entirely
constitutional under this analysis.104
In sum, federal courts have a duty to implement congressional
preferences on constitutional enforcement (whether direct or
proxy), provided those directives are validly enacted. A statute that
deprives federal courts of their essential structural role is not a
valid statute and must be ignored by the courts.
3. Correcting Wrongs
“One of the first duties of government,” Chief Justice Marshall
declared in Marbury v. Madison, is to “furnish [a] remedy for the
violation of a vested legal right.”105 Since Marbury, many in the
federal courts field have embraced this principle, known more familiarly by the refrain “a right without a remedy is no right at
all.”106 Under this principle, federal courts have a duty to remedy
every constitutional violation, even if a remedy is not required to
preserve the constitutional order107 or a statute does not order the
courts to issue a remedy.108 Adherents to this principle see judicial

103
See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 443–48 (1944) (holding that Congress could prohibit a criminal defendant from raising a constitutional defense because the defendant had the opportunity to raise the issue in a prior administrative
proceeding); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 49–65 (1932) (holding that an administrative tribunal could adjudicate an Article III case, provided that an Article III court
retained ultimate authority on legal and jurisdictional questions).
104
I stress that my focus here is only on the structural imperatives underlying judicial
review. As noted above, some believe that Congress may not have the authority to
limit judicial remedies, even if such limitations would not risk the constitutional order.
See supra note 102.
105
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
106
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 209 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also
Bandes, supra note 11; Ziegler, supra note 11.
107
See supra Subsection II.A.1.
108
See supra Subsection II.A.2.
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remedies as a form of “corrective justice”—a fundamental value
inherent in adjudication.109
Though the right-remedy principle has significant normative appeal, it has considerably less basis in constitutional law. First, a
broad principle of corrective justice can be found nowhere in the
text, structure, or history of the Constitution. Of the entire document, only the Fifth Amendment (which orders “just compensation” for “private property . . . taken for public use”) and the Suspension Clause (which safeguards the availability of the writ of
habeas corpus) contemplate a remedy for a particular wrong.110
Nowhere else are remedies mentioned, which is significant since so
many state constitutions specifically guaranteed remedies for
wrongs.111 This makes perfect sense because, as described above,
liberty was originally to be protected through structural arrangements, not a system of rights and remedies.112 Moreover, judicial
doctrine has long treated the right-remedy principle as precatory,
often refusing to issue relief in cases of sovereign or official immunity.113 In short, “[t]he dictum of Marbury v. Madison notwithstand109

Some might argue that right-remedy principle is borne not of a penchant for corrective justice, but of deterrence. Only by providing a remedy for every wrong, the
argument goes, can the federal courts adequately deter constitutional violations. Although deterrence, as noted above, is an appropriate goal for federal remedies, adequate deterrence does not require strict adherence to the right-remedy principle. Optimal levels of deterrence can rarely be reduced to the one-to-one formula that the
principle implies. This is especially true in the field of constitutional torts, where
agency relationships are often convoluted and official immunity questions feature
prominently in nearly every suit. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay:
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345
(2000). Thus, even if the principle is understood as a tool of deterrence, there is nothing in the Constitution that requires the federal courts to deter unconstitutional conduct according to a specific ratio. This is not to say that issuing a remedy for every
wrong is normatively undesirable. Empirical analyses may in fact confirm the wisdom
of the principle and recommend its increased usage. Rather, it is simply to say that the
right-remedy principle is not constitutionally compelled.
110
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; U.S. Const. amend. V.
111
Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1309, 1310 (2003) (noting that the right to a remedy “expressly or implicitly appears in
forty state constitutions”); id. at 1310 n.6 (providing citations to individual state constitutions).
112
See supra Subsection II.A.1.
113
See Bellia, supra note 11, at 784 (stating that the right-remedy principle in English law “was not a black letter legal doctrine; it was merely a platitude”); Fallon &
Meltzer, supra note 11, at 1779–87 (“Notwithstanding Marbury’s contrary intimations,
the structure of substantive, jurisdictional, and remedial doctrines that existed at the
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ing, there is no right to an individually effective remedy for every
constitutional violation. The ultimate commitment of the law of
[constitutional] remedies . . . is to create schemes and incentives
adequate to keep government, overall and on average, tolerably
within the bounds of law.”114
Second, the right-remedy principle incorrectly implies that every
constitutional harm must be remedied in a constitutional case.
Early judicial practices belie this claim, however—a point that,
ironically enough, is well illustrated by Marbury itself. As is well
known, William Marbury sought the Supreme Court’s help in securing his position as justice of the peace for the District of Columbia. The Secretary of State in John Adams’ administration
(none other than John Marshall himself) had failed to deliver Marbury’s commission to him before Thomas Jefferson became President. Jefferson ordered his Secretary of State, James Madison, to
withhold the commission. This, Marbury alleged, violated his statutory right to the commission.115 Marbury thus brought a mandamus
action—a type of civil rights action demanding that a government
official obey the law—to force Madison to deliver the commission.116 A mandamus was an extraordinary remedy, however, and it
was unavailable if more traditional remedies were sufficient. Thus,
every mandamus action, including Marbury’s, required the court to
determine whether alternative means were available to remedy the
harm alleged. Chief Justice Marshall did just this in Marbury.
Madison had contended that Marbury’s application for mandamus
was displaced by a common law action for detinue, which allowed
one to retrieve a lost “thing . . . or its value.”117 According to Martime of the Constitution’s framing and that evolved through the nineteenth century by
no means guaranteed effective redress for all invasions of legally protected rights and
interests.”).
114
Fallon, supra note 14, at 311.
115
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 154, 162 (1803) (stating that Marbury’s right “originate[d] in an act of congress passed in February 1801” and that “the
law creating the office [to which Marbury was commissioned], gave [Marbury] a right
to hold for five years”). It is of no matter that Marbury was asserting a statutory as
opposed to a constitutional right, for both are public rights.
116
For background on the mandamus action and its role in enforcing the rule of law,
see Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1963); Harold Weintraub, English Origins of Judicial Review By Prerogative Writ: Certiorari and Mandamus, 9 N.Y. L. F. 478 (1963).
117
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173.
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shall, a detinue action would not provide Marbury with relief since
a public office was not a “thing” that could be retrieved and the
“value of a public office . . . is incapable of being ascertained.”118
Thus, having found detinue law insufficient to provide relief, Marshall found that Marbury had stated “a plain case for a mandamus.”119 It is clear from the case, however, that if detinue law (or
some similar common law action) had been available, Marbury’s
enforcement action against the Secretary of State would have lay
not in public law, but simply in the private law of tort.120
Marbury thus illustrates that private law was an accepted tool for
enforcing public law obligations. This aspect of Marbury is by no
means aberrational. Scholars who have studied early constitutional
enforcement agree that “[t]he predominant method of suing officers in the early nineteenth century was an allegation of common
law harm, particularly a physical trespass.”121 Thus, the Founders
assumed that the common law, not the Constitution, would remedy
government wrongs.122 In light of this, it is fallacious to posit that
118

Id.
Id.
120
See Bellia, supra note 11, at 787–88; Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 396, 420–21 (1987).
121
Woolhandler, supra note 120, at 399; see also Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983
and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade
Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (1985) (“[I]n the first 70 years of the Republic, many
of the Supreme Court’s important constitutional decisions came in suits in which defendants sought, on constitutional grounds, to avoid liability, rather than in suits in
which plaintiffs sought to obtain damages or injunctive relief for alleged constitutional
violations.”); Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Acts,
and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 Geo. L.J. 1493, 1510 (1989) (“Traditionally, governmental actors were liable at common law for injuries inflicted in the course of their
employment.”); Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 1109, 1122–
23 (1969) (noting that, in the nineteenth century, “the view developed that the governmental officer acting under a void statute, or outside the bounds of a valid statute,
may be regarded as stripped of his official character, and answerable, like any private
citizen, for conduct which, when attributable to a private citizen, would be an offense
against person or property”); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural
Reform Revisited, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1387, 1400 (2007) (stating that, in early America,
“there was no distinctively federal cause of action to remedy constitutional violations,” so “[a]ctions against officers typically alleged a common law harm”).
122
Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles 20–
21 (1997). This is consistent with English practice at the time of the founding, which
was well-known to the Founders. See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807
(K.B. 1765); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763); Wilkes v. Wood, 98
Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles,
119
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federal courts have a duty to imply a remedy directly from the
Constitution for every constitutional wrong. Constitutional remedies need only be implied as necessary to maintain the constitutional order.
***
In sum, federal courts have a general duty to implement constitutional norms through doctrine, but also have a duty to prioritize
congressional implementing preferences over judicial preferences.
Federal courts have no duty, however, to issue a remedy in each
and every case. I now turn to a deeper analysis of the judiciary’s
implementing rules, a discussion that reveals the surprising degree
to which congressional preferences can replace judicial preferences.
B. The Status of Judicial Implementing Rules
In discharging their duty to implement constitutional norms,123
federal courts produce judicial decisions. For a long time, decisions
with a constitutional element, such as Miranda, were known simply
as “constitutional law.” In one sense, this was descriptively accurate, as such judicial decisions clearly involve the Constitution and
have the force of law. Though accurate, the terminology inhibited a
deeper understanding of judicial behavior in constitutional cases.
In 1975, Henry Monaghan suggested that decisions like Miranda
were perhaps not “constitutional” law at all. He explained that a
“surprising amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional
‘interpretation’ is best understood as something of a quite different
order—a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial
rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required
by, various constitutional provisions.”124 Monaghan called this
“substructure” of law “constitutional common law.”125
In the past decade, several scholars have developed a robust theory of constitutional decisionmaking based on Monaghan’s original
107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 772 n.54 (1994) (“The Wilkes case was a cause célèbre in the
colonies, where ‘Wilkes and Liberty’ became a rallying cry for all those who hated
government oppression.”).
123
See supra Subsection II.A.1.
124
Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2–3 (1975).
125
Id.
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description of constitutional common law. Professors Richard
Fallon,126 Mitchell Berman,127 and Kermit Roosevelt128 have explained that judges engage in two “conceptually distinctive” behaviors when adjudicating most constitutional cases.129 One behavior is
the assigning of meaning to the “constitutional operative proposition.”130 Constitutional operative propositions are the specific, textually self-defining directives found within the Constitution. To wit:
Senators must be thirty years old,131 trials must be by jury (except in
cases of impeachment),132 and statutes imposing taxes must originate in the House of Representatives.133 Even ambiguous clauses,
however, will still contain a core operative proposition. For example, although the Equal Protection Clause might mean many
things, it at least means that “the government may not treat some
people worse than others without adequate justification.”134 In adjudicating cases that implicate an operative proposition, courts will
often simply apply the operative proposition just as it is written,
such as in the case of eligibility requirements for U.S. Senators.
Sometimes, however, the operative proposition, though relevant to
the case, will be opaque with regard to the specific issue presented—such as in a case falling outside the core meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause. In these instances, federal courts engage
in a second type of behavior: the crafting of “constitutional decision rules.”135

126

Fallon, supra note 86; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996
Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54, 61–75 (1997).
127
Berman, supra note 94, at 32–39.
128
Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What
the Court Does, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1649, 1652–58 (2005); see also Dan T. Coenen, A
Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look
Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1575, 1580–84 (2001).
129
Fallon, supra note 86, at 38.
130
Berman, supra note 94, at 15.
131
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 3.
132
U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2.
133
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 7.
134
Roosevelt, supra note 128, at 1657 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For other formulations of the Equal Protection Clause’s core meaning, see Berman, supra note 94, at 9 (“[G]overnment may not classify individuals in ways not reasonably designed to promote a legitimate state interest.”); Sager, supra note 98, at
1215 (“A state may treat persons differently only when it is fair to do so.”).
135
Berman, supra note 94, at 15.
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A constitutional decision rule is a rule of decision designed to
implement constitutional operative propositions. For example,
upon reading that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the state from
“compel[ling] [a defendant] in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself,” a court can reasonably conclude that the state
may not physically coerce witnesses during interrogations.136 Having assigned meaning to the operative proposition, the court must
then consider whether the proposition can be applied on its own
terms, or must be implemented with a decision rule. As explained
in the preceding Section, the Supreme Court designed the Miranda
decision rule to implement Fifth Amendment guarantees because a
straightforward application of the Fifth Amendment could not, in
practice, preserve Fifth Amendment rights.137
Other examples abound.138 By way of further illustration, consider just two. In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court considered whether a police department may screen job applicants using
an examination “designed to test verbal ability, vocabulary, reading and comprehension,” even though the test disadvantaged African-American applicants.139 The precise issue was whether a test
adopted without a discriminatory motive, but nonetheless having a
discriminatory impact, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The
Court said no; it was the state’s motive, not the effects of its behavior, that mattered. Compare this to Lemon v. Kurtzman.140 There,
the Court considered the constitutionality of a state statute that reimbursed parochial school teachers who taught public school students. The Court held the statute unconstitutional because the
statute’s “principal or primary effect” was the advancement of re136

U.S. Const. amend. V.
See supra Subsection II.A.1.
138
See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Judicial Activism 19 (2006) (noting that
“constitutional decisionmaking” involves numerous atextual rules, such as “tiers of
scrutiny, five-factor tests, requirements of congruence and proportionality, . . . undue
burden analysis, . . . bewildering distinctions, between content-based and contentneutral regulations of speech, between hard and soft money, between intentional discrimination and disparate impact”); Berman, supra note 94, at 61–78 (noting the use
of decision rules in various constitutional doctrines); Fallon, supra note 86, at 78–79
(listing different types of doctrinal tests, including “forbidden-content tests,” “suspect-content tests,” “balancing tests,” “non-suspect-content tests,” “effects tests,”
“purpose tests,” and “appropriate deliberation tests”).
139
426 U.S. 229, 235 (1976).
140
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
137
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ligion.141 Unlike in Washington, “effects” mattered this time. Washington and Lemon might appear contradictory on their face, but
only if one believes that the Court was interpreting the Constitution in both cases. This, however, is untenable. Both the First
Amendment and Equal Protection Clause are utterly opaque with
regard to the status of unintended effects. Washington and Lemon,
like so much constitutional doctrine, can only be understood as examples of constitutional implementation through decision rules—
the judiciary’s effort to create doctrine so that constitutional norms
may be realized.
It is appropriate to pause here and field a question that is certain
to arise in the reader’s mind: how does the judiciary know what our
nation’s “constitutional norms” are? Indeed, if posed rhetorically,
this question amounts to an important criticism, for it conveys a
suspicion that the judicial articulation of constitutional norms derives not from the Constitution, but from the judges’ own personal
norms. This criticism appeals to the charms of originalism, an issue
I addressed briefly above.142 There, I answered the originalist
charge that constitutional implementation was illegitimate by
pointing out that originalism, inasmuch as it fails to check lawlessness by non-Article III actors, is thus sometimes illegitimate itself.
Here, I answer the slightly different charge that even if originalism
might sometimes be illegitimate, it is still superior to open-ended
implementation because it better tethers unelected decisionmakers
to objectively ascertainable standards—that is, constitutional text.
Such beneficent limitations will operate across the entire range of
constitutional decisions, thus offsetting the relatively few circumstances where originalism may fail to check abuses by non-Article
III actors. The argument, in short, is that it is better to check the
judges all of the time than for the judges to check everybody else
some of the time.
This argument is not without force, but it overestimates the constraining force of constitutional text. The Fourth Amendment, for
example, says not one whit about whether police officers may use

141
142

Id. at 612–14.
See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
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thermal imaging devices to search homes without a warrant.143 Nor
does Article III provide any more than the barest guidance on
whether the slow loss of shoreline due to rising sea levels is a harm
sufficient to challenge a federal agency’s response to global warming.144 In deciding these questions, just like so many others in constitutional adjudication, courts necessarily run out of text. Thus,
originalists, whether they admit it or not, are often unchecked by
constitutional text.145 They, like all judges, must resort to extratextual sources—history, tradition, structure, precedent, policy—to
resolve cases. In consulting these sources, judges search not for
“meaning” in the textual sense, but for meaning in a deeper sense.
They seek to uncover the deep-seated norms that have guided our
country, but are not exhausted in constitutional text. It is from this
process that judges determine constitutional norms, and it is a
process in which all judges engage. Thus, the project of implementing constitutional norms, while dangerously open-ended in the eyes
of some, is no more open-ended than the project of originalist constitutional interpretation.146 In both instances, judges run out of text
and must discern constitutional norms from other sources.147 Having addressed this, I return now to the principal discussion—that of
decision rules and their constitutional basis.

143
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that the use of thermal imaging technology on a private home is a search and thus is impermissible without a warrant).
144
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520–21 (2007) (holding that Massachusetts
had standing to challenge the EPA’s regulation of carbon emissions).
145
Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 68–75 (Illinois Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research
Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
07-24),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 (explaining why “the meaning discovered by
constitutional interpretation [of text] runs out” and arguing that constitutional practice therefore requires the “supplementation” of constitutional text).
146
Dan T. Coenen, The Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible “Semisubstantive”
Constitutional Rules, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2835, 2860 n.158 (2009) (arguing that judicial creation of decision rules is no more threatening to democratic self-government
than originalism because originalist judges must “inevitably extract from historical
materials ‘the principles the ratifiers understood themselves’ and then ‘apply those
principles to unforeseen circumstances’”) (quoting Robert H. Bork, Slouching Towards Miers, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 2005, at A12).
147
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849,
857–60 (1989) (arguing that history and tradition should be studied to determine the
proper application of constitutional text); Solum, supra note 145, at 75–79 (identifying
several methods through which a judge might supplement textual meaning).
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Although federal courts have an obligation to implement the
Constitution through decision rules, it would be incorrect to say
that each specific rule is the only permissible decision rule. In
Miranda, for instance, it would have been perfectly acceptable for
the Court to require suspects be informed that they have the “right
to refuse to speak” rather than the “right to remain silent.”148 And
for that matter, the Court could have decided not to create a per se
rule, but rather to impose on the state the burden to disprove coercion by clear and convincing evidence. One can debate whether
this decision rule would be preferable to the Miranda rule, but
there can be little debate that the Court clearly had the authority to
impose such a rule. The point here is that there may exist multiple
decision rules, any one of which can sufficiently implement constitutional guarantees. Where multiple rules exist, the Court is free to
choose among the competing rules.
Given that federal courts may choose among competing rules,
there is no reason why a court cannot select a rule designed by a
non-Article III actor.149 Suppose that in 1968, two years after the
Court issued Miranda, Congress amended the Federal Rules of
Evidence to render inadmissible any confession not preceded by a
series of warnings. Suppose further that the warnings promulgated
by Congress were exactly the same as those ordered by the Court
in Miranda itself, except that Congress adopted the phrase “right
to refuse to speak” instead of “right to remain silent.” In a subsequent case, the Court would be free to replace its Miranda rule
with the evidentiary rule designed by Congress. If the Court could
re-design the rule on its own, there is nothing to prevent it from
borrowing that design from some other entity.150 Of course, the

148

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent . . . .”). The Court explicitly
recognized this point in Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202 (1989), stating that
Miranda warnings need not “be given in the exact form described in that decision.”
149
Indeed, the Miranda Court acknowledged this possibility when it invited “Congress and the States to . . . search for . . . other procedures which are at least as effective [as Miranda warnings] in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in
assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
150
Professor Monaghan recognized this early on in his theory of constitutional common law. The “substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules” he described, being sub-constitutional, was “subject to amendment, modification, or even
reversal by Congress.” Monaghan, supra note 124, at 2–3.
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Court may only borrow that other design if it would be sufficient to
enforce the constitutional order.
This hypothetical scenario is not completely fanciful, for Congress did attempt to modify the Miranda rule in 1968. Unlike the
hypothetical modification explained above, however, Congress
sought to largely re-instate the “totality of circumstances” test that
Miranda had displaced.151 Though the statute remained dormant for
many years, it came before the Court in 2000 in Dickerson v.
United States.152 In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Court refused to implement the congressionally designed decision
rule. Importantly, the problem was not that the totality of circumstances rule had originated with Congress,153 but that the rule was
not an “adequate substitute for the warnings required by Miranda.”154 That is, the rule did not “meet the constitutional minimum”
imposed by the Fifth Amendment.155
Not only may Congress offer replacements for constitutional decision rules; states may as well. Consider, for example, Smith v.
Robbins.156 In Smith, the Court evaluated the procedures that a
state-appointed defense attorney must follow in declining to file a
frivolous appeal—procedures that the Court had previously outlined in Anders v. California.157 In Anders, the Court explained that,
where a public defender has reviewed the record and found no
ground justifying a non-frivolous appeal, he should inform the
court of this by letter and the court should evaluate the merits of
any putative appeal independently.158 In the Court’s view, such procedures were necessary to ensure that the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel was not accidentally forfeited. After Anders,
however, California developed its own set of procedures for public
defenders who refused to file frivolous appeals. At issue in Smith

151
18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (2000) (listing several factors to consider when evaluating the
coerciveness of an interrogation and stating that the “presence or absence” of any factor “need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession”).
152
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
153
Id. at 440–41 (stating that a “legislative alternative to Miranda” would be permissible if it were “equally as effective in preventing coerced confessions”).
154
Id. at 442.
155
Id.
156
528 U.S. 259 (2000).
157
386 U.S. 738 (1967).
158
Id. at 744.
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was the constitutionality of the California procedures, which in
turn required the Court to assess the constitutional significance of
the Anders procedures. The Court explained that “the Anders procedure is merely one method of satisfying the requirements of the
Constitution for indigent criminal appeals”—that is, the Anders
procedure is a decision rule.159 “The Constitution erects no barrier,”
the Court explained, to states designing their own decisions rules
and to the Court’s decision to give them effect.160 Finding that the
California procedures “affor[ded] adequate and effective appellate
review to indigent defendants,” the Court approved of the procedures in place of those promulgated in Anders.161
Thus, decision rules designed by Congress or the states can stand
in the place of decision rules designed by the Court. This relationship between the Court and non-judicial actors is most comfortable
when the rule proffered by Congress or the states is more protective of individual rights than the Court’s decision rule. Thus, if
Congress wishes to create a statutory right not to have one’s car
searched during a traffic stop, persons deprived of this statutory
right could press this right in court and not be thwarted by judicially created decision rules holding that officers, consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, may search cars in that setting.162 There
will rarely be an objection to congressional preferences that augment individual rights.
A more troublesome situation is presented, however, when Congress or the states promulgate decision rules that provide less protection than judicially created decision rules. For example, suppose
Congress enacted a law allowing federal officers to use thermal imaging devices to search private homes, provided that the officers
are on public property during the search and have a reasonable
suspicion that unlawful activity is afoot. This law would provide
less protection than is currently available under the Fourth
Amendment, since officers currently need probable cause to justify

159

Smith, 528 U.S. at 276 (emphasis added).
Id.
161
Id. (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956)).
162
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (“If a car is readily mobile and
probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus
permits police to search the vehicle without more.”).
160
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such a search.163 For those who believe that the Constitution’s
meaning is simply a sum of judicial holdings, this law is patently
unconstitutional. In contrast, for those who accept that decision
rules are judicial creations that implement constitutional norms in
one of several acceptable ways, this law is not necessarily unconstitutional.164 Its validity does not depend on whether it provides less
protection than a judicially created rule, but only on whether it
would endanger the constitutional order.
C. The Conditions Under Which Proxy Enforcement Will Be
Acceptable
Thus far, I have explained that federal courts have a duty to
“implement” the Constitution by crafting doctrine that will make
constitutional guarantees real.165 I have also explained that federal
courts have a duty to obey the preferences of Congress with regard
to direct or proxy enforcement, provided that Congress’ edicts are
themselves constitutional.166 Finally, I have argued that implementing rules devised by the Court are not properly understood as
“constitutional” law and thus may be displaced by rules devised by
Congress or the states, provided that those rules would in fact protect constitutional norms from erosion. These arguments thus
make proxy enforcement contingent on two matters: (1) whether
Congress has sanctioned the practice, and (2) whether the alternative rule will, in fact, uphold the constitutional order. In this Section, I explain in detail how a court should determine whether
these two conditions have been met.

163
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that the use of thermal imaging technology on a private home is a search and is therefore impermissible without a
warrant).
164
See Berman, supra note 94, at 105 (explaining that “Congress might disagree
with” a judicially created decision rule and “be moved to legislate” its own decision
rule; in that case, the question “would then become whether to allow the judge-made
decision rule to be replaced by the Congress-made one”).
165
See supra Subsection II.A.1.
166
See supra Subsection II.A.2.
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1. Discerning Congressional Intent
Congress enjoys plenary control over the federal courts and the
enforcement of federal law.167 If Congress wants federal courts to
enforce the Constitution directly, it may order them to do so. In
contrast, if Congress desires that federal courts enforce subconstitutional law in place of constitutional law, it may also order
courts to do so (provided that the sub-constitutional law maintains
the constitutional order, a criterion I discuss in the following Section). Thus, in determining whether to enforce the Constitution by
proxy, federal courts must first discern congressional preferences.
How should federal courts do this? Much in the same way that
they discern any congressional preference—by reading the statute
and applying standard rules of statutory interpretation. Thus,
where Congress sanctions tort suits against federal officers and
leaves unchanged the availability of Bivens actions, federal courts
can reasonably infer that Congress remains comfortable with direct
enforcement pursuant to Bivens.168 At the same time, it is impossible to read such a statute as commanding direct enforcement
through Bivens. Federal courts are thus left with significant discretion in these instances: Congress has not revealed a preference for
proxy or direct enforcement, and federal courts are thus free to
choose their own course.
Divining congressional preferences in Section 1983 cases will
work slightly differently. Clearly, in enacting Section 1983, Con-

167
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850) (holding that Congress’ Article I power to
create the lower federal courts implicitly includes the power to define their jurisdiction).
168
For instance, in amending the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1988, Congress
exempted from FTCA coverage any claim “which is brought for a violation of the
Constitution of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A). As this provision was
explained in a report by the House Judiciary Committee:
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens, . . . the courts have identified this
type of tort [as compared to a common law tort] as a more serious intrusion of
the rights of an individual that merits special attention. Consequently, H.R.
4612 would not affect the ability of victims of constitutional torts to seek personal redress from Federal employees who allegedly violate their Constitutional
rights.
H.R. Rep. No. 100-700, at 6 (1988). For a recent article assessing the status of Bivens
in light of various congressional enactments, see James E. Pfander & David
Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 Geo.
L.J. (forthcoming 2009).
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gress evinced a preference for direct enforcement. Indeed, a major
impetus for the statute was the impotence of sub-constitutional law
(specifically, state law) in protecting citizens from governmental
overreaching.169 Despite its original preference for direct enforcement, Congress is, of course, free to modify Section 1983 in favor
of proxy enforcement in specific instances. Thus, if Congress
wishes to set up a comprehensive regulatory scheme to address discrimination in the school setting, it is free to modify Section 1983
so that educational inequality is dealt with pursuant to a separate
statute. Federal courts already have a relatively well-developed
tool for assessing congressional goals in this regard. Courts ask
whether “the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive [so as to] demonstrate congressional intent
to preclude” a Section 1983 action.170 Although any measure of
congressional intent is likely to breed some disagreement, this test
is relatively stable and is thus a useful way to sort out vexing problems of congressional intent arising from congressional silence.171
Further, this test appropriately ignores state law in interpreting
congressional preferences for or against direct enforcement
through Section 1983. While a federal statute can be read as an implied modification of another federal statute, state law cannot be
read in this way because, quite obviously, state and federal laws issue from different sovereigns.172
2. Preserving Constitutional Order
If Congress opens the door to proxy enforcement—either by
specifically ordering it or tacitly allowing it—federal courts must
169

Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution 1863–1877, at 454–
59 (1988).
170
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20
(1981) (refusing to enforce federal maritime statutes though a § 1983 suit); see also
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368 (1983) (holding Bivens action unavailable because of
congressional enactment of “comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions
giving meaningful remedies”); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 346–48 (1997)
(permitting § 1983 suits for relief under portions of the Social Security Act that do not
provide comprehensive remedies).
171
See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 796–97 (2009) (unanimous opinion applying this test).
172
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 765–66 (1985) (discussing the principles under which one federal statute will be read as impliedly modifying an earlierenacted statute).
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then determine whether the sub-constitutional law to be applied
will indeed preserve the constitutional order. In making this determination, federal courts should focus on three factors: the procedures attending sub-constitutional enforcement, the substance of
the sub-constitutional law, and the remedies available pursuant to
it.
Procedures. It is hardly novel to note that procedures affect results. Indeed, over seventy years ago, the chief drafter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure referred to procedure as the “Handmaid of Justice.”173 Thus, in determining whether sub-constitutional
law will produce sufficient results, federal courts should evaluate
the entire procedural context in which enforcement will occur. This
includes an inquiry into the formal procedures used, as well as a
more holistic assessment as to whether enforcement, on the whole,
is likely to be accomplished. This evaluation will be the most
searching where sub-constitutional adjudication will occur outside
an Article III court, since cases that occur in a federal court are adjudicated using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—rules that
are presumptively adequate.174 In these situations, the procedures
and overall context need not be identical to those in federal court,
but they must, on the whole, be sufficient to vindicate basic constitutional standards.
Federal courts are often called upon to make this determination,
as the recent case of Boumediene v. Bush illustrates.175 The issue in
Boumediene was whether prisoners detained at Guantanamo Bay

173

Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 Wash. U. L.Q. 297 (1938); see also
Mirjan R. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process 148 (1986) (“[P]rocedure is basically a handmaiden of
substantive law.”).
174
The instances where proxy enforcement cases will occur in state court are rare.
Suits against federal officers, even if filed in state court, will almost always end up in
federal court because federal officers have a statutory right to remove the case to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1442. While a sub-constitutional law action against a state officer will likely end up in state court (save diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332), proxy enforcement will rarely be permissible in these cases since § 1983
evinces a preference for direct enforcement without regard to state law. See supra
note 172 and accompanying text. Thus, proxy suits most likely to be adjudicated outside an Article III court are those that must be originally filed in a federal administrative tribunal. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 367 (ordering federal employee to file First
Amendment claim in administrative, rather than Article III, court).
175
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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could seek relief through petitions for habeas corpus in light of
Congress’ attempt to foreclose such efforts in the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA). Although Congress is free to curtail habeas relief
in various respects,176 the resulting remedial apparatus must be
“neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person’s
detention.”177 The Boumediene Court was thus charged with determining whether Congress’ replacement procedures were an “adequate substitute” for standard habeas procedures.178 Five justices
held that they were not. The DTA procedures, regardless of
whether they “satisf[ied] due process standards,” created a “considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of fact.”179 Detainees were assigned not a lawyer, but rather a “Personal Representative” who was not considered an “advocate”; the government’s
evidence was “accorded a presumption of validity”; the “circumstances [surrounding the detainee’s] confinement” limited “his
ability to rebut the Government’s evidence against him”; and the
appellate review process could not “cure all defects in the earlier
proceedings.”180 For these reasons, the Court held that the DTA
procedures were an inadequate substitute for a formal habeas corpus petition.
Boumediene is instructive on the issue of procedural adequacy in
two respects. First, it highlights assorted criteria that will affect the
adequacy of a procedural system in protecting the constitutional
order. Second, it illustrates that a procedural system can be inadequate even though the procedures comport with due process doctrine.181 Boumediene contemplates, and properly so, a broadranging inquiry into how the overall context of adjudication will affect results. This aspect of Boumediene is also nicely illustrated by
the landmark case of Ex parte Young.182 In Young, the Court allowed railroad employees to seek an injunction in federal courts
176

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
177
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977).
178
128 S.Ct. at 2662–63. This question necessarily followed the Court’s prior conclusion that the right to habeas corpus relief “has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.” Id.
179
Id. at 2270.
180
Id. at 2260.
181
Id. at 2270 (“Even if we were to assume that the CSRTs satisfy due process standards, it would not end our inquiry.”).
182
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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against the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. Although the employees could challenge the statute in state
court by first violating the statute and then asserting its unconstitutionality as a defense, the federal courts found this prospect unrealistic. The statute ordered that violators “be punished by a fine not
exceeding five thousand ($5,000) dollars, or by imprisonment in the
state prison for a period not exceeding five (5) years, or both such
fine and imprisonment.”183 Few employees would risk such harsh
penalties to test the constitutionality of the law, with the effect that
the penalties “close[d] up all approaches to the courts, and . . . prevent[ed] any hearing upon the question.”184 Thus, although the assertion of a defense might normally be procedurally adequate to
enforce constitutional standards,185 the special context surrounding
Ex parte Young made this likelihood remote. A civil rights action
in federal court was necessary.
Thus, in assessing the procedural sufficiency of a proxy enforcement system, the court should pay attention to standard indicia of
procedural fairness as well as other contextual issues that may, as a
practical matter, impede the vindication of the constitutional norm
at issue.
Substance. The substance of sub-constitutional law will also affect whether the constitutional order will be preserved. To assess
whether the sub-constitutional law will be substantively adequate
to the task of preserving the constitutional order, courts should focus first on whether liability is triggered by the sub-constitutional
law. For instance, tort law, inasmuch as it forbids police officers
from beating suspects during an arrest, will be triggered, and is thus
substantively sufficient to maintain the constitutional order. At the
same time, government contract law would be wholly impotent to
protect citizens from police brutality and thus would be an unacceptable proxy.
Where liability would be triggered under both the constitutional
and sub-constitutional law, the sub-constitutional law will be (at
183

Id. at 128.
Id. at 148.
185
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49–54 (1971) (holding a § 1983 action to be unavailable while a state criminal action was pending because the state procedures—
including the ability to raise a constitutional right as a defense—were adequate to
protect the defendant’s rights).
184
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least from a substantive perspective) an adequate replacement for
the constitutional decision rule. If liability is not triggered, however, the federal courts should not immediately dismiss the possibility of proxy enforcement. This point owes to the fact that constitutional decision rules are not “constitutional” law in a formal
sense, but simply judicial creations used to implement constitutional norms. If federal courts have the authority to modify these
decision rules (which, given the ambiguous and open-ended nature
of the constitutional text, they quite often do), federal courts are
free to replace their own rules with those devised by non-Article
III actors.186
Thus, if liability is not triggered under the sub-constitutional law,
the question becomes whether the alternative decision rule is substantively adequate to maintain the constitutional order. A subconstitutional law that covers ninety-nine percent of the police brutality cases brought under the Fourth Amendment will quite likely
continue to preserve Fourth Amendment norms. Suppose, for instance, that the tort law of a particular state recognizes a narrow
defense to liability for battery where the defendant’s imposition of
force was based on the mistaken identity of the victim. This defense will likely defeat some tort claims based on police brutality,
but it is difficult to believe that police officers, or the police departments that train them, will dispense with adherence to Fourth
Amendment norms. Federal courts could thus apply a proxy enforcement rule in those situations, even if it meant that some victims of police brutality (that is, those abused based on a mistaken
identity) will not receive relief. Importantly, however, courts would
be free to revisit the advisability of proxy enforcement in this situation. If the invocation of the mistaken identity defense increased
dramatically such that the boundaries between the state and its
citizens were effectively shifted, proxy enforcement could, and
should, be ended.
I recognize that courts may find it challenging to determine the
extent of overlap between constitutional and sub-constitutional
law, and further, whether something less than complete overlap
will protect constitutional norms. This point, however, speaks to
the normative desirability of a specific rule of proxy enforcement
186

See supra Section II.B.
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and not to the practice’s overall permissibility. Moreover, as noted
above, federal courts are constantly called on to consider whether a
doctrinal rule will adequately implement constitutional norms.187
Thus, while open-ended and susceptible to bald value judgments,
this type of decisionmaking is hardly foreign to the federal judicial
role in constitutional cases.
Finally, it should be noted that sub-constitutional law will sometimes sweep more broadly than constitutional doctrine. For instance, one of the chief barriers to relief in any civil rights action is
the qualified immunity defense, which precludes recovery in cases
where the officer “does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”188 This defense is often unavailable in tort suits against
governments, however, meaning that plaintiffs will recover when
their rights were in fact violated, regardless of whether the rights
were clearly established.189 Thus, in a police brutality case, a plaintiff is likely to collect damages under tort much more often than
under the Fourth Amendment, even though both laws, on their
face, prohibit brutality. In these cases, proxy enforcement would be
a net gain for plaintiffs.190
Remedies. Finally, a court presented with a proxy decision
should also focus on the remedies provided by the alternative law.
187

See supra Subsection II.A.1.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see generally Alan K. Chen, The
Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional Balancing Tests,
81 Iowa L. Rev. 261 (1995) (explaining official immunity analysis in constitutional tort
cases); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public
Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 Geo. L.J. 65, 65–66, 79–80 (1999) (explaining that Bivens suits rarely result in an assessment of damages and that
“[q]ualified immunity is undoubtedly the most significant bar” to recovery).
189
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (imposing liability on the United States “under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the [negligent or wrongful] act
or omission occurred”); United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005) (stating that,
because “the United States waives sovereign immunity ‘under circumstances’ where
local law would make a ‘private person’ liable in tort,” any official or municipal immunity created by state law is not applicable in FTCA suits against the federal government).
190
To be sure, this gain will only be realized by plaintiffs alleging constitutional, but
not common law, claims. For plaintiffs bringing both sub-constitutional and constitutional claims, no net gain will be realized. While many litigants bring common law
claims with their constitutional claims, a large number of litigants do not—especially
prisoners. See, e.g., Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005).
188
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To be sure, the issue of remedies can sometimes be cast in procedural or substantive terms, since the ultimate relief a plaintiff may
obtain is undoubtedly affected by both procedure and substance.
Yet, there will be issues that fall solely into the remedial domain.
Damages caps are the best example. Although punitive damages
are a standard feature of state tort law, they are typically unavailable in tort claims against the federal and state governments.191
Similarly, state common law employment discrimination claims are
often governed by standard damages doctrine,192 whereas damages
for employment discrimination by public agencies are often
capped.193 Limitations on damages, however, need not be fatal to
proxy enforcement. As with the procedural and substantive inquiries, the question is not whether the relief available under an alternative law is equal to, or greater than, that available in a civil rights
action, but simply whether the alternative relief is sufficient to
maintain the minimum constitutional order. As noted, courts have
ample resources to make this determination and are free to revisit
the issue should their initial determination prove incorrect.
D. Illustrations
Having justified the use of proxy enforcement under certain
conditions, I now make these arguments concrete by applying them
to several different cases.
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee.194 In Fitzgerald, the
parents of an elementary school student brought an Equal Protection claim against a school district under Section 1983. The complaint alleged that the district failed to prevent student-on-student
sexual harassment, thus denying the student equal protection of
the laws. The school district argued that the parents’ Section 1983
191
See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (“The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions
of this title relating to tort claims, . . . but shall not be liable . . . for punitive damages.”); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 31 (1983) (affirming the award of punitive damages in a § 1983 action); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980) (stating that “punitive damages may be awarded in a Bivens suit”).
192
See, e.g., Niblo v. Parr Mfg., 445 N.W.2d 351, 355–56 (Iowa 1989) (holding that
the remedy for wrongful discharge covers the “complete injury,” including economic
loss such as wages and out-of-pocket expenses, as well as emotional harm).
193
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (capping damages at either $50,000; $100,000; $200,000;
or $300,000, depending on the size of the defendant-employer).
194
129 S. Ct. 788 (2009).
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claim was precluded because Title IX was the exclusive avenue for
addressing the wrongs alleged.
As set out above, proxy enforcement though Title IX will be
permissible if Congress has ordered so (or at least, through its silence, left that possibility open) and Title IX will maintain a sufficient degree of equality so that equal protection norms will not become a nullity. In Fitzgerald, proxy enforcement is inappropriate
because Title IX cannot be read, implicitly or explicitly, as withdrawing access to Section 1983. In enacting Title IX, Congress did
not create a private right of action similar to that created in Section
1983; instead, Congress’ chosen method of enforcing Title IX was
the withdrawal of federal funding.195 This suggests that Congress
did not intend to displace the private right of action in Section
1983. Thus, regardless of whether Title IX would maintain sufficient equality, proxy enforcement is inappropriate because it contradicts Congress’ choice on the matter.
Monroe v. Pape. Monroe presents a similar issue to that in Fitzgerald, except that Monroe involves the role of state law, rather
than a federal statute. The facts of Monroe, discussed above,196
should be familiar. Thirteen Chicago police officers, without a warrant or other justification, entered James Monroe’s home and arrested him. Monroe, together with his wife, brought suit under Section 1983 for a violation of their constitutional rights. The
defendants argued that the Monroes should have brought their
claims under state tort law, not the Constitution. The Court rejected this invitation to enforce the Constitution by proxy.
The Court’s decision was correct. In enacting Section 1983, Congress ordered federal courts to issue relief to any plaintiff who has
suffered a “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.”197 There is no hint in Section 1983 that
its availability depends on the nonexistence of relief under state
195
Although a private cause of action does exist to enforce Title IX, the cause of action is judicially implied. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
As such, the existence of the action says little about congressional preferences on enforcement. Fitzgerald, 129 S. Ct. at 796 (“Title IX contains no express private remedy . . . . This Court has never held that an implied right of action had the effect of
precluding suit under § 1983, likely because of the difficulty of discerning congressional intent in such a situation.”).
196
See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
197
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
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law; as noted above, Section 1983 was specifically enacted to create
an avenue of relief irrespective of state law.198 Therefore, in Monroe, the Supreme Court was correct to follow Congress’ choice and
ignore the state law. Monroe thus illustrates that state law will
rarely, if ever, be an adequate stand-in for a Section 1983 action.
Unlike a federal statute that can be interpreted as an implied repeal of Section 1983,199 state law can never be invoked to interpret
congressional objectives regarding the availability of Section 1983.
Bush v. Lucas.200 In Bush, an employee of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) publicly criticized the
agency on several occasions. As a result of these statements, the
employee was demoted. Thereafter, the employee brought a
Bivens action seeking damages for a violation of his First Amendment right to free expression. The federal government argued that
the plaintiff’s remedy lay not in a Bivens action, but under the Civil
Service Reform Act (CSRA), a federal statute providing for the
resolution of employment disputes (including First Amendment
claims) between the federal government and its employees.
Under the framework explained above, proxy enforcement is
likely inappropriate in this case. The problem lies not with congressional intent regarding proxy enforcement,201 the substance of the
alternative law,202 or with its remedial force,203 but rather with the
198

See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1,
19–21 (1981) (interpreting federal maritime statutes as impliedly foreclosing use of
§ 1983 as an enforcement mechanism).
200
462 U.S. 367 (1983).
201
The statutory scheme evinces no clear preference for or against proxy enforcement. Id. at 373 (“Congress has not expressly authorized the damages remedy that
petitioner asks us to provide. On the other hand, Congress has not expressly precluded the creation of such a remedy by declaring that existing statutes provide the
exclusive mode of redress.”). Thus, the recognition of a Bivens action is open to the
discretion of the court. See supra Subsection III.C.1.
202
In this instance, Bush’s claims would be adjudicated under First Amendment law,
not under a statute creating speech rights. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 386 (noting that the
“First Amendment claims raised by petitioner . . . are fully cognizable within [the
statutory] system”). Thus, as the substance of the legal standard will be the same in
both circumstances, there can be no concern over a substantive variation.
203
Under the statutory scheme, plaintiffs are eligible to receive remedies similar, but
not identical, to those in Bivens actions. Id. at 388 (describing remedies that will “put
the employee in the same position he would have been in had the unjustified or erroneous personnel action not taken place”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although punitive and emotional distress damages are not available, it is
199
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procedural aspects of the alternative enforcement. A recent study
of First Amendment claims by federal employees suggests that the
“administrative scheme [utilized in such cases] is not vindicating
the First Amendment . . . rights of federal employees.”204 The study
makes a “startling” finding: in the entire history of the statutory
review process, “not a single First Amendment . . . claim filed by a
federal employee against the employee’s agency has ever been successful on the merits.”205 The study traces this result to the “lack of
neutrality and competency” in the administrative officers charged
with hearing such cases, as well as the absence of “meaningful judicial review by an Article III court.”206 First Amendment claims fail
under the CSRA, it seems, because CSRA procedures—not the
laws applied or the remedies issued—are insufficient to deliver relief. As such, the federal courts may not rely on the CSRA process
to vindicate First Amendment rights and instead must allow litigants to make use of Bivens actions.
Wilson v. Libby.207 In Wilson, Valerie Plame and her husband,
Joseph Wilson, brought a Bivens action against Vice President
Cheney; his chief of staff, “Scooter” Libby; Richard Armitage of
the State Department; and Karl Rove, top advisor to the President.
The wrongful act for which the couple sued was the deliberate
leaking of Plame’s status as a covert agent for the CIA. This act,
the couple alleged, infringed upon their rights of free speech, privacy, property, and equal protection. The defendants argued that,
regardless of whether the leak constituted a constitutional violation, the couple’s remedy lay under the federal Privacy Act, not the
Constitution through a Bivens action.
The D.C. Court of Appeals recently sided with the defendants.
This decision is likely wrong because the substance of the Privacy

unlikely that this substantially affects the deterrent force of the remedial system. As
noted above, the qualified immunity defense does not apply in these cases, thus meaning that the statutory scheme will, on the whole, provide remedial force that meets or
exceeds a Bivens action. See supra notes 188–190 and accompanying text.
204
Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 1101, 1103 (2008).
205
Id. (emphasis omitted).
206
Id. at 1139.
207
535 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

PREIS PRE PP

2009]

10/20/2009 7:31 PM

Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy

1715

Act (rather than it procedures208 or remedies,209 or any congressional intent underlying the Act210) is insufficient to protect the
constitutional norms invoked by the plaintiffs. At first glance, the
Privacy Act may seem substantively sufficient. It forbids the disclosure of information “about an individual”211 under circumstances
that, in this case at least, would be unconstitutional.212 Yet there is a
glaring hole in the substantive law in this case: the Privacy Act does
not apply to the Offices of the President and Vice President.213
Thus, the only defendant arguably liable under the Privacy Act
would be Richard Armitage. It is difficult to believe that the President and the Vice President, together with their entire staffs, could
be deterred from transgressing constitutional norms by holding
their confederates from other agencies liable under the Privacy
Act.214
208
Privacy Act claims may be adjudicated in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Thus, the procedures available in a Privacy Act claim will be the exact same procedures as those available in a federal court constitutional action. Further, there is no
indication that the larger context of the adjudication will systematically prevent enforcement. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
209
Victims of Privacy Act violations are entitled to “actual damages” as well as the
“the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)
(2006).
210
There is no indication in the Privacy Act that Congress intended to displace the
Bivens action. Thus, the decision to adopt proxy enforcement in this instance is entirely within the province of the courts.
211
5 U.S.C. § 552a(4)–(5) (2006).
212
The D.C. Circuit correctly observed this as well. See Wilson, 535 F.3d at 707
(“Each claim in the Wilson complaint is based on . . . disclosure of Privacy Act protected information. . . . Thus, each Constitutional claim, whether pled in terms of privacy, property, due process, or the First Amendment, is a claim alleging damages
from the improper disclosure of information covered by the Privacy Act.”).
213
The Privacy Act applies to agencies, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2006), and under the
Act an agency is defined by reference to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 5
U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1) (2006). FOIA, in turn, does not apply to the offices of President
or Vice President. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445
U.S. 136, 156 (1980) (holding that the Office of the President is not an “agency” pursuant to FOIA); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F.
Supp. 2d 20, 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that the Office of the Vice President is not an
“agency” under FOIA).
214
It might be argued that holding confederates liable will dissuade violations by
those in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and the Executive Office of the
Vice President (EOVP) because confederates will thereafter be less likely to assist in
the transgressions. But this claim is dubious for two reasons. First, it seems likely that
the EOP and EOVP will always be able to find willing confederates to carry out their
plans, and second, that they will often not need any confederates. The plan in this

PREIS PRE PP

1716

10/20/2009 7:31 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 95:1663

Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko.215 In Malesko, the Court
considered an Eighth Amendment claim by a prisoner against a
federal halfway house. After suffering a heart attack, the plaintiff
brought a Bivens action alleging that the prison corporation failed
to take account of his fragile medical condition. That failure, alleged the plaintiff, amounted to “deliberate indifference” and thus
was an Eighth Amendment violation.216 The Supreme Court rejected this claim. In its view, a Bivens action was unnecessary because the plaintiff “enjoy[ed] a parallel tort remedy.”217 The Court
suggested that this remedy lay in some type of “ordinary negligence” claim against the prison.218
A tort suit against a prison in this circumstance is likely a permissible avenue of constitutional enforcement. There is no indication that Congress has disapproved of enforcement by proxy here,
and the procedures applicable to the tort action, whether the suit is
brought in state or federal court, will be traditional adjudicatory
procedures.219 Moreover, the applicable law is, in fact, more protective of rights than the constitutional standard. A prison will be licase could have been fully executed without the participation of Richard Armitage.
That is, Plame’s covert status could have been leaked to Robert Novak directly by
Scooter Libby or any other member of the EOP or EOVP. In this sense, it is difficult
to conclude that Privacy Act claims for the misconduct alleged are an adequate tool
for keeping government within bounds.
215
534 U.S. 61 (2001).
216
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (promulgating a deliberate indifference standard).
217
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72–73.
218
Id.
219
One could challenge the efficacy of state court adjudication by arguing that state
courts are less willing to enforce the rights of marginalized individuals than federal
courts. The force of this argument—first presented in Burt Neuborne, The Myth of
Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1120–21 (1977)—has been undercut, however, by numerous empirical studies. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1457, 1491–94 (2005) (reviewing empirical literature on the subject). For this reason, normative assessments of federal jurisdiction and practice increasingly ignore the issue of parity. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 233, 236 (1988)
(seeking to “define a role for the federal courts without evaluating the comparative
abilities of the federal and state courts in constitutional cases”); Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State
Courts, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1211, 1214, 1221 (2004) (dismissing reliance on parity in
allocating cases between federal and state courts because scholars “will never resolve
the either-or problem,” that is, “the common assumption . . . that cases must be litigated either in federal court or in state court”).
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able in tort for failing to protect a prisoner from harm if the failure
was negligent.220 In contrast, a prison will be liable under the Eighth
Amendment for failing to protect a prisoner only if the failure was
reckless—“a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.”221
Thus, there can be no objection to enforcement by proxy based on
the substantive content of the alternative law. Finally, as to the
remedies available, a tort action against the prison will typically
make available to the plaintiff the standard remedies (compensatory and punitive damages) that would be available in a constitutional tort action.222 Thus, proxy enforcement was permissible in
Malesko.
Carlson v. Green.223 Carlson is similar to Malesko in several respects: it is an Eighth Amendment claim brought by a prisoner
against a prison. The key difference between the two cases, however, is that the prison in Malesko was a privately operated prison,
whereas the prison in Carlson was run by the federal government.
Thus, a tort action against the prison in Malesko would have proceeded entirely under state tort law, while a tort action in Carlson
would have proceeded under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA).224 This is important because the FTCA, unlike most state
tort laws, does not allow punitive damages.225 Thus, determining
whether proxy enforcement is appropriate in Carlson requires one
to determine the importance of punitive damages in maintaining
Eighth Amendment norms. There can be no objection to proxy en220

See Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 41 cmt. f (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 314A(2) (1965);
Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, §§ 323–28 (2000); see also Brownelli v.
McCaughtry, 514 N.W.2d 48, 50–51 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that an inmate had
a claim against a prison employee who negligently failed to provide medical assistance); Breaux v. State, 326 So. 2d 481, 483 (La. 1976) (holding that prison officials
had a duty to protect a prisoner being attacked by another inmate); Taylor v. Slaughter, 42 P.2d 235, 236–37 (Okla. 1935) (holding that a jailor was obliged to protect a
prisoner from harm at the hands of other prisoners).
221
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
222
See, e.g., Adams v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 187 P.3d 1190, 1198 (Colo. App. 2008).
223
446 U.S. 14 (1980).
224
Although independent contractors may be government actors for the purposes of
the Constitution, West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54–57 (1988), they are not covered by
the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006).
225
See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006) (“The United States shall be liable, respecting the
provisions of this title relating to tort claims . . . but shall not be liable . . . for punitive
damages.”).
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forcement on other grounds, such as the preference of Congress on
the matter, the procedure attending the sub-constitutional litigation, and the substance of the sub-constitutional law.226
This is a difficult question because punitive damages are specifically designed to have a deterrent effect, and deterrence is the
chief role of the constitutional tort action.227 Because of this, one
might expect the unavailability of punitive damages to weaken the
deterrent effect of an FTCA action significantly. This may be true,
but it depends on the actual availability of punitive damages in civil
rights actions generally. As it turns out, punitive damages are
available in theory more than in practice. They are not available
against counties and municipalities,228 nor available for conduct that
is less than reckless or intentional.229 In this way, the civil rights action, which is presumed to have deterrent effect, has proceeded in
large measure without its chief deterrent tool—punitive damages.
Assuming that the current structure of civil rights remedies adequately maintains Eighth Amendment standards,230 it is quite possible to conclude that tort suits providing only compensatory damages will be a sufficient replacement for civil rights actions. This
inference is bolstered by the fact that the defense of qualified immunity is not available in FTCA suits.231 Thus, while the maximum
damages award in an FTCA action is likely to be smaller than in a

226
Congress has signified its comfort with the availability of Bivens actions for harms
that could also be remedied under the FTCA. See supra note 170. Because FTCA
claims must be litigated in federal court, the procedures applicable can be considered
presumptively adequate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). Carlson’s Eighth
Amendment claims were premised on inadequate medical care and would thus give
rise to liability under the FTCA for medical malpractice. See, e.g., Hannah v. United
States, 523 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 2008) (adjudicating an FTCA claim by a prisoner
for substandard medical treatment received in prison).
227
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994) (“[T]he purpose of Bivens is to deter the
officer.”).
228
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
229
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
230
I recognize that this is a questionable assumption. See, e.g., Michael Wells, Punitive Damages for Constitutional Torts, 56 La. L. Rev. 841, 841 (1996) (arguing that
the Supreme Court’s current punitive damage doctrine in constitutional tort cases is
inadequate). Yet, the value of punitive damages generally is a question separate from
what I address here: whether proxy enforcement is permissible in light of the current
shape of civil rights doctrine.
231
See supra notes 188–190 and accompanying text.
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Bivens or Section 1983 action, the average FTCA award is likely to
be larger, resulting in adequate deterrence.
Schweiker v. Chilicky.232 Chilicky was an action by three individuals regarding the wrongful denial of Social Security disability
payments. Using an administrative review process created by Congress, all three individuals were able to recoup their improperly
denied payments. Despite this, the plaintiffs brought a Bivens action seeking damages for “emotional distress and for loss of food,
shelter and other necessities proximately caused by [the government’s] denial of benefits without due process.”233 The Court refused to recognize a Bivens action because “Congress . . . provided
what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional
violations.”234
The Court was correct to adopt a system of proxy enforcement
in Chilicky. First, the statutory scheme suggests a congressional
preference for proxy enforcement, since Congress created an
elaborate system for determining the proper disability payments.
Even if one sees this as less than clear, there is no indication that
Congress preferred direct enforcement, thus leaving proxy enforcement open to judicial discretion. Second, there is no indication that the statutory scheme is procedurally inadequate to provide the appropriate remedies to claimants.235 Third, the substance
of the constitutional and sub-constitutional law is the same because
liability under either law will hinge on the availability of disability
benefits under the Social Security Act. And finally, the remedies
available under the statutory scheme are likely sufficient to prevent
improper denials. While it is true that relief for emotional distress
is unavailable under the statutory scheme, it is unlikely that the
lack of damages for emotional distress, applicable only to a narrow
category of cases, will lower substantive due process rights below
an acceptable threshold. While this assessment appears correct in
the two decades since Chilicky, the Court is, of course, free to revisit it should subsequent events or research reveal the statutory
scheme to be inadequate.
232

487 U.S. 412 (1988).
Id. at 419 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
234
Id. at 423.
235
In fact, a specific goal of the statutory scheme was to improve prior procedures
deemed to be flawed. Id. at 423–26.
233
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Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale.236 In Johnson, a black employee brought suit against the Fort Lauderdale Fire Department
for discrimination on the basis of his race. He alleged that the Department violated his rights under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. At issue in the case was whether he could maintain an
Equal Protection claim using Section 1983 given the availability of
relief through Title VII. The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff
could pursue his constitutional claim because Title VII did not
“preempt[] a constitutional cause of action under [Section] 1983.”237
Contrary to the court’s opinion, however, proxy enforcement in
Johnson was likely permissible. As a preliminary matter, the congressional enactment of Title VII can be read as an implied prohibition on public employment Section 1983 cases, thus opening the
door to proxy enforcement.238 Next, there are no formal procedures
or informal contextual matters that would render Title VII, as compared to Section 1983, ineffectual in preventing discrimination in
public employment. The cases can be litigated in federal court, and
plaintiffs thus have access to the full procedural tools and independence inherent in that tribunal.239 With regard to substance,

236

148 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1231.
238
I recognize that many courts have taken the opposite view. See, e.g., Booth v.
Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a plaintiff may bring discrimination claims against municipal employers under both Title VII and the Equal
Protection Clause via § 1983). This view, however, contradicts numerous other areas
in which comprehensive statutory schemes have been deemed to be an implied repeal
of § 1983 actions. See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 127
(2005) (holding that § 1983 cannot be used to enforce the Telecommunications Act of
1996 because the Act itself provides the sole remedy); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle,
184 F.3d 999, 1011 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (denying a § 1983 action to enforce the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because the ADA impliedly foreclosed access to § 1983); Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 868 F.2d 1364, 1366–71 (4th
Cir. 1989) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) provided an exclusive remedial scheme). As the Court has recently explained in the Title
IX area, Congress can be presumed to “displace § 1983 suits enforcing constitutional
rights” where it creates statutory “rights and protections” that are similar to the rights
and protections available under § 1983. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S.
Ct. 788, 794 (2009). The rights and remedies available under Title VII are similar to
those available at the time Title VII was enacted. Thus, contrary to the majority view
in these cases, congressional intent does not foreclose proxy enforcement in this area.
239
While it is true that Title VII claimants must first exhaust available administrative
remedies, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006), there is little reason to think that this exhaustion requirement renders the law ineffectual at controlling discrimination. If one
237
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there can be little objection to Title VII as a stand-in for Equal
Protection law, since Title VII prohibits public employers from
“discriminat[ing] against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”240 Finally,
where remedies are concerned, Title VII is likely sufficient to deter
unconstitutional discrimination. Successful Section 1983 claimants
can obtain compensatory and punitive damages, both of which are
available under Title VII.241 Although Title VII caps compensatory
and punitive damages between $50,000 and $300,000 (depending
on the number of persons employed by the defendant-employer),242
these caps do not apply to back-pay and attorney’s fees,243 which
can be quite substantial. These amounts, it is fair to presume, procure substantial compliance with the law. To argue otherwise, one
must argue that Title VII is ineffectual at controlling discrimination
throughout the entire private sector, since Title VII applies there
too.244 Although courts considering proxy enforcement should be
open to empirical studies suggesting otherwise, a court considering
this issue today could reasonably conclude that Title VII is a fair
proxy for an Equal Protection action in the public employment
context.
III. IS PROXY ENFORCEMENT DESIRABLE?
In Part II, I identified the instances where federal courts may
enforce the Constitution through sub-constitutional law. While this
defines the practice as permissible in certain instances, it does not
deems Title VII cases effective in the private sphere (a reasonable assumption), there
is no reason to think that they suddenly become insufficient in the public sphere.
240
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
241
Although Title VII only allows punitive damages for intentional discrimination,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2006), Equal Protection doctrine only recognizes a violation where the discrimination was intentional. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
238–48 (1976). Thus, where an Equal Protection violation has been committed, punitive damages will be available in a Title VII suit.
242
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006).
243
The cost of an adverse judgment to a defendant in a Title VII case is the sum of
the damages awarded, the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, and the defendant’s own attorney’s fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006) (granting the court discretion to allow
prevailing plaintiffs to collect reasonable attorney’s fees from the defendants).
244
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006) (imposing liability on any “employer,” which “means
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees”).
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resolve another important issue: whether the practice is desirable.
On the one hand, it is quite possible that enforcement by proxy,
though a permissible practice from a constitutional perspective, is
nonetheless undesirable from a normative perspective because it
sacrifices important values, apart from keeping government within
the bounds of constitutional norms. On the other hand, it is also
possible that enforcement by proxy sacrifices no values and instead
creates new value. In this Part, I consider the desirability of proxy
enforcement aside from its constitutional permissibility.
I explain that proxy enforcement will be desirable only where
the alternative law is federal in nature. I reach this conclusion by
considering several normative values implicated by the practice, including shared constitutional interpretation, constitutional development, constitutional expression, and administrative efficiency. In
short, proxy enforcement using a federal statute (or rarely, federal
common law) allows for shared constitutional interpretation and
does not frustrate other important interests. In contrast, proxy enforcement using state tort law, while allowing states a role in constitutional implementation, will impose significant practical costs
on federal courts. I conclude this Part by briefly reviewing the
cases where proxy enforcement is permissible and indentifying
which of those cases are fit, normatively speaking, for proxy enforcement.
A. Sharing the Constitution with Congress
A central obsession of modern constitutional theory is the question of interpretive supremacy—who should control the meaning
of the Constitution?245 Though the views of scholars and judges on
this issue can be mapped any number of ways, it is possible to chart
most views somewhere along a continuum that stretches between
“judicial supremacy” and “popular constitutionalism.” These ideological endpoints, like poles on a magnet, are intensely repellant to
each other. Commentators of all persuasions have expended great
effort justifying one view to the exclusion of the other, or instead
245

See Friedman, supra note 16, at 159 (stating that the “academic obsession with
the countermajoritarian problem” is the “result of historical, professional, and intellectual forces that, as a cultural matter, simply were unavoidable for many academics
(even though they seemed to matter little to those beyond the professorate)”).
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reconciling both views to each other, with little success. Constitutional enforcement by proxy, however, offers a partial solution. As
explained below, it allows courts to uphold core constitutional values by holding government officials accountable for transgressing
constitutional norms, while simultaneously giving effect to the
views expressed by the electorate.
1. Judicial Supremacy
Modern judicial supremacy was born in Cooper v. Aaron.246
There, the Court pronounced with great confidence that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”247 A half-century since Cooper, the Supreme Court has, if
anything, only become more supreme. Thus, it is now a “cardinal
rule of constitutional law” that the Court is the “ultimate expositor
of the constitutional text.”248 Or as Chief Justice Rehnquist put it,
“it falls to [the] Court, not Congress, to define the substance of
constitutional guarantees.”249 Congress may not speak in constitutional terms, we are told, or else “[s]hifting legislative majorities
could change the Constitution.”250 In short, proponents of judicial
supremacy hold that the Constitution is defined by the Court—and
only the Court.
The strongest case for judicial supremacy likely rests on the
Court’s greatest successes. For example, judicial supremacy produced Brown v. Board of Education.251 When no one else would
stand up for black schoolchildren, it was the Court—aided by its
self-proclaimed interpretational supremacy—that came to the rescue. Or when a state attempted to outlaw pure political expression
in the form of flag burning, it was the Court in Texas v. Johnson
that stood on principle, striking down the statute despite enormous
popular support for the law.252 Thus, the case for judicial supremacy
self-consciously acknowledges, and even flaunts, its “countermajoritarian” nature. Judicial supremacy, being practiced by judges
246

358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Id. at 18.
248
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000).
249
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003).
250
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997).
251
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
252
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
247
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insulated from “shifting legislative majorities,” protects core constitutional values from passionate majorities.
Protecting constitutional values is not judicial supremacy’s only
justification. Another justification is more pragmatic: the judiciary
must have the final word, it is argued, because final words are useful. Justice Brandeis’ famous quip is particularly apt here: “in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”253 Professors Alexander and
Schauer find significant value in the capacity of judicial review to
“say [with finality] what the law is.”254 For them, a “central moral
function of law is to settle what ought to be done,” and judicial supremacy accomplishes this goal more desirably than other alternatives.255 Of course, it is fair to ask why the judiciary, rather than
other constitutional actors, should be entitled to set the final word.
That has been answered, however, by appeals to the judiciary’s insulation from majoritarian pressures, its institutional practices, and
its comparative expertise.256
2. Popular Constitutionalism
Popular constitutionalists believe essentially what President
Abraham Lincoln believed on the day of his first inauguration in
1861: “if the policy of the government upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the
Supreme Court, . . . the people will have ceased to be their own
rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government
into the hands of that eminent tribunal.”257 If there is any fundamental principle in American government, it is a dedication to
popular sovereignty. The United States belongs to the people, and
the officials of the federal government serve at the people’s pleasure and for their welfare. Thus, for a popular constitutionalist, “the
253

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
254
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
255
Alexander & Schauer, supra note 12, at 457; see also Farber, supra note 12.
256
Alexander & Schauer, supra note 12, at 476–77; Roosevelt, supra note 128, at
1696–700 (arguing that courts are likely superior to non-judicial actors in interpreting
text, though not necessarily superior in designing decision rules to implement the
text).
257
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in Abraham
Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings 579, 585–86 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1976).
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role of the people is not confined to occasional acts of constitution
making, but includes active and ongoing control over the interpretation and enforcement of constitutional law.”258 Popular constitutionalists believe that the people should be involved in every act of
constitution-making.
Popular constitutionalists reserve their fiercest criticism for the
Rehnquist Court’s “Section Five” decisions evaluating Congress’
power to legislate under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Boerne v. Flores is a classic example.259 Prior to 1990,
the Supreme Court invalidated facially neutral laws burdening the
free exercise of religion if those laws were not supported by a compelling government interest. Then, in 1990, the Court reversed
course, holding that facially neutral laws raise no free exercise
problems, regardless of the burden imposed on religious practices.260 Congress disliked this turn of events. In 1993, therefore, it
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the purpose of which was to “restore the compelling interest test as set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”261
In City of Boerne, decided four years later, the Supreme Court
held the RFRA unconstitutional because Congress had attempted
to “alter[] the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.”262 The Court
explained it thus:
If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, no longer would the Constitution be superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
means. It would be on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and,
like other acts, . . . alterable when the legislature shall please to

258
Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 959, 959
(2004).
259
521 U.S. 507 (1997). Other cases include United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
627 (2000) (striking down the Violence Against Women Act), United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act), and Kimel
v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (holding that Congress did not
have the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act).
260
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
261
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2006).
262
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
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alter it. Under this approach, it is difficult to conceive of a prin263
ciple that would limit congressional power.

On these grounds, City of Boerne is akin to Lochner v. New York,
the now-mythic case in which the Supreme Court struck down social legislation supported by democratic majorities.264
Thus, the case in favor of popular constitutionalism stands
chiefly on its consonance with America’s deep commitment to democratic rule.265 It is the people’s Constitution after all, not the
Court’s, and the people therefore ought to have a say in how their
Constitution is applied. Though the judicial apparatus will always
be necessary to implement actual decisions, the judiciary should
nonetheless defer to the people in close cases. Such deference affirms “the quintessentially democratic attitude in which citizens
know themselves as authorities, as authors of their own law.”266
Moreover, by listening to the populace in setting constitutional
meaning, the Court encourages a sort of democratic selfactualization. Finding their voice relevant to constitutional questions, the public will explore and express their views, thus instigating further exploration and expression, all of which leads to a more
informed populace and better self-government. As Dean Larry
Kramer has explained, “Supreme Court decisions do not settle
constitutional disputes so much as provide ammunition for their
continuation.”267 This continuation, however, is valuable because it

263

Id. at 529 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1013, 1023 (2004) (drawing a parallel between Lochner
and City of Boerne); Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40
Cath. Law. 25, 39–40 (2000) (“The most striking thing about the [Boerne] opinion is
how the logic of Boerne parallels the logic of Lochner v. New York.”).
265
To be sure, there are many varied strains of thought often placed under the umbrella of “popular constitutionalism.” In presenting this brief summary of the school’s
central views, I do not mean to suggest that numerous alternative views do not also
exist. For a summary of several views, see James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without
Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1377, 1378–80 (2005), and Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 Geo. L.J.
897, 906–11 (2005).
266
Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 1983.
267
Kramer, supra note 258, at 972.
264
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“provides the inspiration for reshaping the Constitution so as to
keep it fresh and current with society.”268
3. Mediating Supremacy and Populism
As described above, judicial supremacy and popular constitutionalism are fundamentally irreconcilable. Supremacists insist on
judicial insulation from popular will because judging is the business
of law, not politics. Populists insist that the people have a part in
constitutional interpretation because law exists to serve the people.
There is no way to both include and exclude the people at the same
time—except perhaps through enforcement by proxy.
When a court enforces a constitutional norm through a subconstitutional law, the court is able to stand up for the Constitution
and yet allow the electorate to have significant—but not total—
regulatory control over the issue in question. Core values that judicial supremacy is thought to protect—chiefly, minority rights in the
face of intolerant majorities—will not be sacrificed through enforcement by proxy because, as explained above, the practice is
only permissible if the alternative law will maintain the constitutional order.269 At the same time that constitutional order is being
maintained, however, democratic preferences are also given effect
because the law applied is a product of the legislature, not the
courts.
To be sure, federal courts might be able to mediate these tensions without the proxy enforcement tool through the longstanding “constitutional avoidance” doctrine, whereby courts decide constitutional cases on non-constitutional grounds when possible.270 Although this doctrine does ameliorate tensions over inter268

Id. at 975.
See supra Subsection II.A.1; Section II.B.
270
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 224 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“In recognition of our place in the constitutional scheme, we must act with ‘great gravity and
delicacy’ when telling a coordinate branch that its actions are absolutely prohibited
absent constitutional amendment.”) (citation omitted); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“It is not the habit of the
court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision of the case.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Michael L.
Wells, The “Order-of-Battle” in Constitutional Litigation, 60 SMU L. Rev. 1539, 1548
(2007) (noting that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is aimed at alleviating the
“friction between democratic principles and judicial authority”).
269
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pretive supremacy, it is invoked haphazardly and less often today
than before.271 Even if the doctrine were invoked more often and
more consistently, however, it could not, in the long run, stave off
judicial supremacy as competently as proxy enforcement. As long
as plaintiffs seek constitutional rulings from federal courts, courts
will eventually be forced to rule on sensitive issues of constitutional
law because complaints can be drafted in ways that avoid questions
of sub-constitutional law.272 Thus, only proxy enforcement provides
courts a way to avoid, consistently and autonomously, plowing up
new constitutional ground.
I do not contend that proxy enforcement will always be valuable
in mediating tensions of interpretive supremacy. In fact, the mediating value will only arise where there is, in fact, a substantive difference between constitutional law and the putative alternative. If,
for example, a federal statute creates a right to be free from intentional discrimination on the basis of race at the hands of government officials273 and provides remedies equal to those available in a
Section 1983 action, applying the statute instead of the Constitution will accomplish little because the democratic preferences (the
statute) are perfectly aligned with judicial preferences (the case
law). In this situation, there is no tension in need of mediation by
the Court.
In other cases, however, tensions will be high and the corresponding value of proxy enforcement will be high as well in consequence. If Congress is dissatisfied with the Court’s tiered scrutiny
analysis in Equal Protection cases, it is free to create statutory
rights of equal protection that would be more or less robust than
the rights available under Court doctrine. Thus, Congress could
grant homosexuals rights that the Court has denied them274 and re-

271

See generally Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83
N.C. L. Rev. 847 (2005).
272
This is especially true in the most common types of constitutional tort cases,
where the officer has not acted according to a specific statutory mandate, but instead
has exceeded the scope of his authority. In those cases, state or federal statutory law
will be irrelevant to the determination of whether the Constitution was violated. See,
e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
273
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235 (1976).
274
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–33 (1996) (holding that legislation discriminating against homosexuals should be reviewed under a rational basis test).
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tract from aliens some of the rights the Court has granted them.275
Such statutes could likely stand in the place of the Equal Protection Clause without risking the constitutional order. Certainly, new
rights for homosexuals do not put the constitutional order at risk,
since they simply augment protections that (though minimal) are
already in place. And a retraction of rights available to aliens need
not risk the constitutional order as long as government is still compelled to recognize aliens’ status as “persons” entitled to protections under the major provisions of the Bill of Rights.276 While this
may be undesirable from a policy perspective, it is not constitutionally objectionable unless one can say that strict scrutiny in
alienage cases is constitutionally required—a position that is quite
difficult to take considering the text of the Equal Protection
Clause.
Inasmuch as enforcement by proxy gives effect to the choices of
non-Article III actors, it encourages those actors to take an increasingly greater role in propounding their own solutions to various regulatory problems. That is, inasmuch as judicial supremacy
breeds legislative apathy, enforcement by proxy should encourage
legislative activism. The supremacy evidenced in City of Boerne illustrates this. With the RFRA, Congress did not, as the Court
claimed, attempt to “alter[] the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause”; it simply sought to create statutory rights protecting the
exercise of religion.277 Had the Court been open to the possibility of
proxy enforcement, it would have concluded quite readily that the
RFRA could stand in the shoes of the Free Exercise Clause. As it

275

See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 850 (7th ed. 2004)
(“All of the Court’s decisions since 1970 [regarding discrimination against aliens]
would appear to be consistent if the Court were using an intermediate standard of review.”).
276
See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368–69 (1886) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to all “persons” regardless of citizenship).
277
To be sure, this mistake was somewhat understandable, since Congress made
clear that the RFRA was a response to a prior constitutional holding by the Court.
See David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 31, 41 (“Perhaps the
Court overlooked this point because Congress’s action, in establishing a statutory
right, was expressly predicated on Congress’s disagreement with the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution—as the reference to ‘Restoration’ in the Act’s title suggests.”).

PREIS PRE PP

1730

10/20/2009 7:31 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 95:1663

was, however, the Court chided Congress, and Congress was left to
believe that it had no regulatory authority to protect free speech.
B. Sharing the Constitution with the States
Although judicial supremacy over Congress is highly contested,
supremacy over the states is well established and widely accepted.
Justice Holmes once compared the two types of judicial supremacy
this way: “I do not think the United States would come to an end if
we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think
the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States.”278
Thus, where state law is implicated in a proxy enforcement case,
there is no tension over supremacy needing amelioration. Yet,
there are still compelling reasons why the federal courts, though
clearly possessed of supreme power, might decline to exercise it
over the states. By applying state law to enforce the Constitution,
federal courts provide states with the regulatory space to develop
their own solutions to persistent constitutional problems. The nation benefits when sub-national sovereigns are able to experiment
with innovative solutions while not simultaneously endangering the
whole nation.279
Smith v. Robbins, discussed above, is a good example of this
principle in action.280 Years before Smith, the Supreme Court held
in Anders v. California that the U.S. Constitution requires publicly
appointed criminal defense attorneys to follow strict rules in declining to file an appeal on grounds of frivolity.281 In Smith, the
Court considered California procedures for attorney withdrawal
that departed from these rules. The Court did not disapprove of
278

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, in Collected Legal Papers 291, 295–
96 (1920).
279
See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 317, 397 (1997) (“Intuition suggests that with fifty different parallel state governments, and countless substate governments as well, innovations in governing or problem solving will occur that
will inure to the benefit of the entire populace in the long run.”); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1498
(1987) (book review) (“Elementary statistical theory holds that a greater number of
independent observations will produce more instances of deviation from the mean. If
innovation is desirable, it follows that decentralization is desirable.”).
280
528 U.S. 259 (2000).
281
386 U.S. 738, 744–45 (1967).
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the procedure simply because it varied from the Anders procedure.
Rather, it held that “the Anders procedure is merely one method
of satisfying the requirements of the Constitution for indigent
criminal appeals.”282 Although Smith was not a classic proxy enforcement case (it was a habeas petition), the illustration is apt.
When a federal court applies a state constitutional or statutory
provision in place of a federal constitutional rule, the same type of
innovation that California attempted in Smith will be respected and
encouraged. If state law is constantly ignored in civil rights actions,
states will naturally become less interested in regulating the statecitizen relationship.
C. Developing the Constitution
The civil rights action, inasmuch as it invites courts to espouse
constitutional meaning, can be a tool of constitutional development. Development, in this sense, is simply the process of constitutional elaboration.283 The Constitution “deals in general language”
and thus demands elaboration.284 As Owen Fiss has put it,
[t]he values that we find in our Constitution—liberty, equality,
due process, freedom of speech, no establishment of religion,
property, no impairments of the obligation of contract, security
of the person, no cruel and unusual punishment—are ambiguous. They are capable of a great number of different meanings.
They often conflict. There is a need—a constitutional need—to

282

Smith, 528 U.S. at 276.
Some see constitutional “development” as the expansion of individual rights. See
John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional
Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 403, 405 (1999) (arguing that constitutional rights are expanded when courts hear larger numbers of constitutional cases). I do not offer it in this sense, however, there is little evidence that
adjudicating civil rights damages actions will actually expand rights. See Healy, supra
note 271, at 930 (raising “serious questions about the extent to which the Court’s departure from the avoidance principle actually promotes the evolution of constitutional
rights”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale
L.J. 87, 89–90 (1999) (arguing that constitutional damages actions may impede the expansion of individual liberties); Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 667, 670 (2009) (presenting empirical evidence that the practice of constitutional avoidance “leads to the articulation
of more constitutional law, but not the expansion of constitutional rights”).
284
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816).
283
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give them specific meaning, to give them operational content,
285
and, where there is a conflict, to set priorities.

The need for elaboration is, in many respects, simply a different
gloss on the need for implementation discussed in Part II.286 Whatever the nature of their kinship, the process of constitutional elaboration might seem to be threatened by constitutional enforcement
by proxy. Proxy enforcement addresses the state-citizen relationship without particularizing constitutional meaning. This raises the
fear that the Constitution will play a diminished role in our lives,
atrophying from lack of use.287
For the most part, this fear is misplaced. It is no doubt true that
constitutional enforcement through common law or statutory actions will decrease the number of constitutional expositions. It is
incorrect, however, to assume that constitutional development will
therefore suffer. As an initial matter, when a court engages in
proxy enforcement, it must at least determine that the alternative
law is sufficient to the task of preserving constitutional norms.
Thus, when the Supreme Court, in Smith v. Robbins, held that a
state rule of procedure could replace the Anders method of attorney withdrawal in criminal cases, the Court by necessity determined whether the state rule adequately protected the defendant’s
right to an attorney.288 As the Court put it there:

285
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice,
93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1979); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 447, 489–94 (1994) (arguing that the Founders intended that federal
courts exercise an “expository function” in Article III “cases” but not “controversies”).
286
Richard Fallon’s theory of constitutional implementation thus recognizes the role
of constitutional elaboration. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 11, at 1800 (“[T]here exists
a substantial body of case law, rising almost to the level of a general tradition, in
which adjudication, and constitutional adjudication in particular, functions more as a
vehicle for the pronouncement of norms than for the resolution of particular disputes.”).
287
Greabe, supra note 283, at 405 (“[T]he corpus of constitutional law grows only
when courts address and resolve novel constitutional claims, but courts often cannot
order a remedy for such claims because of their novelty.”); id. at 410 (“The requirement that the allegedly violated right be clearly established at the time of the action in
question tends, if not to ‘freeze’ constitutional law, then at least to retard its
growth . . . .”).
288
528 U.S. 259 (2000).
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Having determined that [the state withdrawal] procedure is not
unconstitutional merely because it diverges from the [constitutionally required] Anders procedure, we turn to consider
the . . . procedure on its own merits. We think it clear that [the
state] system does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, for
it provides “a criminal appellant pursuing a first appeal as of
right [the] minimum safeguards necessary to make that appeal
289
‘adequate and effective.’”

Thus, even in cases of proxy enforcement, the Constitution will not
be left out of the discussion. It will continue to be discussed and its
minimum requirements will continue to be elaborated.
Even if proxy enforcement does limit constitutional elaboration
to some degree, it is unlikely that much harm will flow from that
limitation. The appropriate inquiry here is not simply whether the
instances of elaboration will decrease, but instead whether the remaining instances of elaboration are sufficient to accomplish the
goal of constitutional development.290 There can be little doubt that
the federal courts will still retain numerous opportunities to address the great majority of constitutional rights in cases involving
them. These opportunities include (1) defenses in criminal and
civil actions, (2) motions to exclude evidence in criminal actions,
(3) assertion of trial-based rights during trial, (4) petitions for a
writ of habeas corpus, and (5) cases where proxy enforcement is
impermissible.
Defenses. Where one is sued for committing a wrong, one way to
escape liability is to claim that the law underlying the prosecution
violates the Constitution. Thus, a person subject to criminal prosecution for burning his draft card can claim that his conduct was free
expression protected by the First Amendment.291 Or a defendant
facing loitering charges can assert that the law used to prosecute
289

Id. at 276 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
This much is evidenced by the widespread support for principles of constitutional
avoidance, particularly the last resort rule, though it clearly decreases the instances of
constitutional adjudication. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Healy, supra note 271 (criticizing the “rise of unnecessary constitutional rulings”). But see Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional
Questions, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 1003, 1035–65 (1994) (supporting the last resort rule in
cases of judicial review of congressional or executive action, but criticizing the rule’s
use in all other cases).
291
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
290
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him was unconstitutionally vague.292 Or a homosexual can assert a
substantive due process defense if prosecuted for homosexual
acts.293 Or a defendant charged with the use of marijuana can argue
that the federal government has no authority to regulate homegrown marijuana.294 Civil defendants can also make use of constitutional defenses, such as in defamation cases,295 cases where personal
jurisdiction is lacking,296 or cases where the defendant is a government actor.297
Motions to Exclude. In state or federal criminal trials, the government may not prosecute a defendant using evidence obtained as
the result of a constitutional violation.298 Where a defendant believes that illegally obtained evidence may be offered against him,
he will normally move the court to exclude such evidence. In these
instances, courts must determine whether the defendant’s constitutional rights were in fact violated. It should go without saying that
such “exclusionary rule” issues arise incredibly frequently in criminal prosecutions, typically implicating Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth
Amendment rights.299 Admittedly, not all constitutional violations
292

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
295
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
296
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
297
When a law or practice of a government is challenged civilly, the government will
often defend itself by arguing that it had the authority to behave as it did. Thus, the
court must evaluate the contours of government authority, often a constitutional
question. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that
Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to
Commerce Clause); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(holding that the federal government has power under the Commerce Clause to apply
minimum wage requirements on state and local governments). Even in police abuse
cases brought under tort law rather than the Fourth Amendment, the contours of the
Fourth Amendment will often be discussed, since the Amendment defines the limits
of police authority. See Lumen N. Mulligan, Why Bivens Won’t Die: The Legacy of
Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers, 83 Denv. U. L. Rev. 685, 709–15 (2006) (noting
that state-law tort actions against government agents will often involve the same constitutional claims as those in civil rights actions, except the issues will arise as defenses
rather than as part of the plaintiff’s affirmative case).
298
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to state criminal cases); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (applying the exclusionary
rule to federal criminal cases).
299
Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75
Fordham L. Rev. 1913, 1915–16 (2007) (explaining that criminal defendants “often
293
294
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merit exclusion, such as “knock-and-announce”300 and certain
Miranda violations.301 And other rights, though generally covered
by the rule, may not be vindicated by the rule if any of several exceptions apply.302 Nonetheless, it is still likely that a large number
and a wide variety of constitutional rights will be addressed in motions to exclude.
Trial-Based Rights. Some constitutional rights apply only at trial.
For example, the right to a trial by jury303 and the right to confront
adverse witnesses304 are issues that will only arise during trial or litigation more generally. These issues will no doubt present themselves to federal courts quite often, regardless of a decrease in civil
rights actions.
Petitions for Habeas Corpus. A state or federal prisoner may
challenge the lawfulness of his detention in federal court by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus.305 Petitions that demonstrate a
constitutional violation connected to the arrest, prosecution, or
conviction of the defendant will merit a new trial, or else the defendant will be freed.306 It is true, however, that some constitutional
violations are not cognizable in habeas. Fourth Amendment violations committed during the defendant’s arrest, even if grounds for
assert constitutional claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments” as a defense because those claims are “relatively costless” to assert and “may be the only
way of avoiding a criminal conviction and the disastrous consequences that follow”).
300
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that violation of the
“knock-and-announce” rule does not require suppression of evidence found in a
search).
301
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642–44 (2004) (holding that failure to give
Miranda warnings does not require suppression of the nontestimonial fruit of a suspect’s voluntary statements).
302
For example, if the constitutional violation occurred in “good faith,” the evidence
obtained will not be excluded. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–26 (1984).
Similarly, if the evidence obtained was sufficiently attenuated from the violation,
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963), was obtained from an independent source, Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537–38 (1988), or would have
been inevitably discovered during a lawful investigation, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431, 442–44 (1984), the evidence is admissible. Finally, evidence will not be excluded
if it is offered in a non-criminal proceeding, such as a parole board hearing. Pa. Bd. of
Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 359 (1998).
303
Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 573–74
(1990).
304
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
305
28 U.S.C. §§ 2254–2255 (2006).
306
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463–65 (1953).
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excluding inculpatory evidence at trial, will not be considered on
habeas.307 More relevant to the elaboration concern, habeas petitioners may not typically take advantage of, or attempt to establish,
new rules of constitutional law.308 While this limits the role of habeas actions in constitutional elaboration, there can be little doubt
that habeas actions still provide a significant opportunity for the articulation of current law.309
Cases in Which Proxy Enforcement Is Impermissible. In Part II, I
explained that courts may enforce the Constitution by proxy only
where (1) Congress has not prohibited the practice, and (2) the alternative law will be sufficient to maintain the constitutional order.310 Thus, there will be many instances where proxy enforcement
is impermissible and constitutional elaboration will therefore occur. Section II.C noted that tort law will rarely, if ever, displace the
Constitution in Section 1983 suits, which means that the Constitution will be adjudicated anytime a federal statute does not prohibit
a Section 1983 suit or is inadequate to the task of maintaining constitutional order. There are a great many areas of government action addressed by constitutional rules, but unaddressed by federal
statutes, such as police practices covered by the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. This means that there will still
likely be considerable adjudication of constitutional questions in
these and other similarly qualified areas.
In sum, these five different instances of adjudication will likely
provide federal courts with significant—and most important, sufficient—opportunities for constitutional elaboration. It is thus difficult to argue that significant areas of constitutional law will decay
into a state of desuetude if certain civil rights actions are handled
through alternative legal regimes.
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Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494–95 (1976).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310–11 (1989) (holding that new rules do not apply
in habeas cases unless the rule declares lawful the behavior for which the defendant
was convicted or is a “watershed” rule of constitutional law—a rarely declared rule of
constitutional law comparable to Miranda or Gideon).
309
For example, the rights to effective assistance of counsel, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–91 (1984), and access to exculpatory evidence, see Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), have been helpfully articulated in countless habeas
actions, even though the petitions attempted to invoke “new law.”
310
See supra Section II.C.
308
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D. Debating the Constitution
According to some, civil rights actions not only provide the opportunity to develop the meaning of the Constitution, but also provide an opportunity for us to debate the core values that bind us together as a nation. Debate is good, the theory goes, because it leads
to informed decisionmaking and, ultimately, change. Brown v.
Board of Education was good for America because it increased the
debate over racial equality,311 and Roe v. Wade was good because it
spurred debate—even “rage” perhaps—over women’s autonomy.312
If constitutional adjudication is to be limited by proxy enforcement, there arises the fear that our national debate, and therefore
our public policy choices, will suffer as well.
This argument is disproved in two principal ways. First, as explained just above in Section IV.C, constitutional litigation, and
thus debate, will not be stymied by proxy enforcement. The process of determining whether proxy enforcement is permissible will
involve questions of constitutional law, and even where proxy enforcement is chosen, numerous adjudicative opportunities to debate the Constitution will still remain.
Second, those who favor the value of constitutional debate often
place too much emphasis on constitutional litigation. Professors
Schauer and Alexander have called this “the conceit of American
constitutionalism”—that is, the belief “that Americans need the
Constitution in order to debate affirmative action, criminal justice,
abortion, religion and state, privacy, or capital punishment.”313
Moreover, even if America depends on litigation to focus its attention on a particular issue, there is no reason to think that statutory

311

See Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and
the Struggle for Racial Equality 421–42 (2004) (arguing that Brown instigated racial
change by antagonizing Southern segregationists who reacted in often violent fashion,
therefore eliciting widespread support for comprehensive civil rights legislation).
312
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 374 (2007) (using the backlash caused by Roe to
argue that “interpretive disagreement [is] a normal condition for the development of
constitutional law”).
313
Alexander & Schauer, supra note 12, at 468 (“[I]t appears to us far from certain
that a constitution is either a necessary or a sufficient condition, or even a significant
causal contributor, to fruitful public debate about matters of great political and moral
moment.”).
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litigation cannot fulfill this role.314 Indeed, many federal statutes are
so far-reaching and comprehensive that they can be seen, according to Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn, as an “intermediate category of fundamental or quasi-constitutional law.”315 Federal statutes
outlawing racial discrimination, for example, reach much further
into our personal lives, and in doing so, demand greater attention
than the Court’s entire body of Equal Protection jurisprudence.316
So too do many other statutes.317 Thus, although constitutional litigation may decline to some degree, there is little reason to believe
that the overall level of public debate will diminish.
E. Administrative Efficiency
I have argued thus far that enforcement by proxy is permissible
where Congress has explicitly or implicitly approved the practice
and where the alternative law would uphold constitutional norms. I
have also argued that, among those circumstances, proxy enforcement will be desirable where interpretational tension exists or
where state innovation is valued. What I have not yet considered,
however, is whether proxy enforcement is even practical. Below, I
explain that proxy enforcement is likely to impose an onerous burden on courts where state law is the putative proxy, a burden that
outweighs any benefit provided by state innovation. With respect
to federal law, however, the costs of the practice will be much
lower, thus making it desirable on the whole.

314

Young, supra note 13, at 424 (“[M]any rights that are fundamental for individuals
in modern America are entirely creatures of statute.”). Justice Scalia expressed a
similar point in his dissent in Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 619 (1988), arguing that it
is foolish to assume that “every constitutional claim is ipso facto more worthy, and
every statutory claim less worthy, of judicial review.”
315
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 13, at 1275; id. at 1237 (“[T]he Civil Rights Act
[of 1964] is a proven super-statute because it embodies a great principle (antidiscrimination), was adopted after an intense political struggle and normative debate and has
over the years entrenched its norm into American public life, and has pervasively affected federal statutes and constitutional law.”).
316
See Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit.7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. (2006).
317
See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621.
(2006); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971. (2006); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2006).
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1. State Law as Proxy
Proxy enforcement is likely to prove quite difficult in cases
where the alternative law is state law for two main reasons: (1) the
ambiguous nature of tort law where constitutional rights are concerned, and (2) the number of sub-national lawmaking bodies.
Among various types of state law that might be invoked in a proxy
situation, tort law is the most common.318 Tort law focuses chiefly
on the interactions between private persons; it instructs persons
how to behave with each other, and imposes liability when people
fail to adhere to its edicts. Constitutional law is different. Its primary focus is on the behavior of the government.319 It instructs government officers how to behave, whether they are enacting legislation or policing the streets. In some instances, it will be clear that
tort and constitutional law will both apply. Thus, where an officer,
having no justification, hits a pedestrian over the head with a nightstick, the officer has violated both tort and constitutional law. Similarly, it will also be clear sometimes that tort law will not apply.
Thus, where a government official denies food stamps to an individual because of her race, tort law will not be available for relief.
If these instances were representative of the whole, courts could
coherently implement a proxy enforcement system. That is, courts
could determine whether tort law would, or would not, deter unconstitutional behavior to the degree necessary to maintain the
constitutional order. But, a court cannot make this determination
unless it is able to ascertain the content of tort law. Yet, tort law
and constitutional law often vary in subtle ways, making it difficult
to know in advance whether tort law will actually apply to uncon-

318

See supra Subsection I.B.1.
Commentators have noted the problems caused by applying tort concepts to constitutional claims. See Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from
Constitution to Tort, 77 Geo. L.J. 1719, 1738–50 (1989) (addressing the deleterious
“implications of tort rhetoric”); Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37
Rutgers L.J. 715, 758 (2006) (“Using tort law to remedy torture [by the U.S. government] is like using nuisance law to handle the generation and disposal of hazardous
wastes. In each situation, the problem is simply much bigger and badder than the
problems for which the law was designed.”); Christina Brooks Whitman, Emphasizing
the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 661, 686 (1997) (“It is
dangerous to define constitutional claims as a narrow subset of tort law because tort
law has been particularly ineffective in dealing with precisely the sorts of interests and
injuries that are at the center of constitutional law.”).
319
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stitutional conduct. It will often be unclear, for example, whether
using thermal imaging to search a house will be an intrusion upon
seclusion under state tort law,320 or whether denying a prisoner access to a toilet in violation of the Eighth Amendment will violate
an innkeeper law,321 or whether an unconstitutional stop-and-frisk
will be a battery.322
Though problematic, this ambiguity in tort law, taken alone, is
not enough to make proxy enforcement unwise. If it were, proxy
enforcement based on federal statutes might also be problematic,
since such statutes may often be ambiguous with respect to their
regulation of unconstitutional behavior. Moreover, a court could
adopt a proxy enforcement system and simply disregard all tort law
that did not clearly provide deterrent force. Such a “clear statement rule” might curtail the number of instances in which proxy
enforcement was used, but it would keep the practice alive and
available.
Yet even this accommodation to the ambiguity inherent in tort
law is likely to be more effort than federal courts are capable of
expending. This owes to the large number of sub-national govern320
For example, the intent of the intruder will often have a role in intrusion upon
seclusion claims but be irrelevant to Fourth Amendment claims. Compare Plaxico v.
Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036, 1039–40 (Miss. 1999) (refusing to impose liability on exhusband who, concerned about the “welfare of his daughter,” secretly took photos of
ex-wife’s lesbian partner in state of undress), with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
353 (1967) (disregarding officer’s intent in finding a wiretap in violation of the Fourth
Amendment). See also Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal.
1998) (“We agree . . . that all the circumstances of an intrusion, including the motives
or justification of the intruder, are pertinent to the offensiveness element [of intrusion
upon seclusion].”); Linda Ross Meyer, Unruly Rights, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 35 (2000)
(“The case law is clear that the offensiveness of the invasion . . . turns on the reasons
and intentions of the invader.”).
321
Innkeeper laws require prisons to protect inmates “against unreasonable risk of
physical harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(1)(a), (2) (1965). While a
beating in violation of the Eight Amendment will likely violate this duty, it is anybody’s guess whether depriving an inmate of adequate nutrition, also an Eighth
Amendment violation, will violate the common law duty as well. See Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678 (1978) (holding that prisoners have an Eighth Amendment right to adequate nutrition).
322
Under many state laws, liability for an “offensive touching” requires proof that
the defendant intended the touching and intended it to be offensive. See Dobbs, supra
note 220, at 58–59 n.4 (discussing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13). It will often be
difficult to tell whether an officer, mistakenly believing he has reasonable suspicion to
stop and frisk a person, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968), nonetheless intended to offend that person.
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ments empowered to make law. In our federal system, the U.S.
government enjoys relatively limited lawmaking authority. In contrast, sub-national governments—including state governments,
counties, and municipalities—enjoy a great deal of authority. A police officer in a particular city is therefore obligated to obey not
just the Fourth Amendment, but also any state constitutional provisions, state statutes, and county or municipal laws. A federal
court that has adopted a proxy enforcement practice—even one
that requires the alternative law to clearly provide relief—must
therefore sort through a large number of state and local laws to determine whether any of them will provide relief. Moreover, once a
court makes that determination, the decision will have little or no
precedential effect outside that particular locality. Thus, federal
courts would not be able to develop a single system of proxy enforcement, or even fifty different systems of proxy enforcement,
but instead would be forced to develop several hundred such systems. Proxy enforcement based on state law would work one way
in Los Angeles County, California; a different way in Cody, Wyoming; and still a different way in Yuma, Arizona, even though the
localities are all part of the Ninth Circuit. Innovation at the local
level has value, but this value is overcome when the avenues of
constitutional enforcement hinge on the shifting policies of Garfield County, Montana (population 1,215).323
Thus, the costs of proxy enforcement using state law are likely to
be too onerous to justify their use. It will be difficult to ascertain
the meaning of tort law in numerous instances and, even if the law
were clear, it would prove difficult to monitor the changes in local
law that will inevitably occur over time.
2. Federal Law as Proxy
The difficulties arising from using state law as a constitutional
proxy are much less pronounced with regard to federal statutes or
regulations. While these laws can be ambiguous, they emanate
from a much smaller set of sources—that is, Congress or administrative agencies. This is not to say that the overall number of appli323
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates, http://www.census.gov/popest/
counties/CO-EST2007-01.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2009) (providing population estimates for counties as of July 1, 2007).
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cable laws will be small (though they will be far less numerous than
all state laws), just that the laws will apply uniformly throughout
the nation. Thus, the role of Title IX in peer-on-peer Equal Protection claims can be completely resolved with one case.324 Such resolution could never be accomplished where state law was concerned.
It is true that proxy enforcement will increase the work of the
federal courts to some degree. Under a direct enforcement scheme,
federal courts would just adjudicate the claim instead of determining, in the first instance, whether the claim could be enforced with
sub-constitutional law. This increased work, however, will yield
significant benefits in mediating supremacy and populism interests.
Moreover, the burden should decrease over time as precedent dictates which laws may, or may not, permissibly stand in for the Constitution. As noted above, this issue has been resolved for the foreseeable future in the Title IX context; it need not be re-litigated at
all unless Congress initiates a change in the law. Should Congress
do so, a judicial reassessment of the proxy enforcement, while
marginally increasing judicial workloads, nonetheless would offer
Congress a seat at the constitutional table, something it would otherwise lack.
F. Illustrations
In Section III.D, I reviewed a variety of cases in which the practice of proxy enforcement might apply and identified the cases in
which it was permissible. Those cases included Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, Carlson v. Green, Schweiker v. Chilicky,
and Johnson v. Bibb County. Based on the normative considerations addressed in this Part, it is thus possible to conclude that federal courts should enforce the Constitution directly in Malesko and
Carlson and enforce it by proxy in Chilicky and Johnson.325
Malesko and Carlson both involved state tort law. As such, practicing proxy enforcement in those cases would embroil federal
courts in the ongoing assessment of state law, which is bound to
change over time and between different jurisdictions. One might
dispute this conclusion by arguing that Carlson actually involved
federal law—specifically the Federal Tort Claims Act. While it is
324
325

See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788 (2009).
See supra Section III.D.
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true that the FTCA was potentially applicable in Carlson, the “federal” nature of the FTCA should not obscure the fact that enforcing the Constitution by proxy in such cases would require the federal courts to delve deeply into state law. The FTCA does not
contain any tort law of its own, but simply adopts the tort law of
the state in which the lawsuit is brought.326 Thus, in the curious instance where federal law essentially replicates state law, proxy enforcement is inappropriate for all of the reasons it would be inappropriate to apply state law on its own.
Chilicky and Johnson, however, are ripe for proxy enforcement.
They both involve a federal regulatory scheme that protects the
same rights at stake had the cases been brought under the Constitution. Further, approving proxy enforcement in these cases is a
ruling that can apply nationwide without necessarily impinging on
constitutional development or debate regarding public benefits or
employment matters. These cases also illustrate the significance of
Congress’ power to articulate the contours of constitutional enforcement without, at the same time, depriving the judiciary of its
structural role. It is a power that could lawfully reach any number
of different constitutional norms currently exclusively maintained
by the federal courts. Most important, it is a power supported by
democratic legitimacy.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution deserves our honor, whether it be in the course
of a trip to Washington, D.C., or a civil rights action. But in honoring the Constitution, it is important to discern exactly what we are
honoring. There is nothing wrong with honoring the First Amendment, for example, through a civil rights action upholding the right
to free expression. But when a court honors free expression
through a federal statute, it does not dishonor the First Amendment. Instead, it honors a principle that lies at the very heart of the
Constitution—democratic rule. A court can honor the Constitution
in more than one way, and proxy enforcement holds great promise
326

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006) (imposing liability on the United States “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the [negligent or wrongful] act or
omission occurred”).
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as a way to honor the popular roots of our Constitution without
neglecting the protection of individual rights for which it has become revered.

